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Essays in Dynamic Corporate Finance
Abstract
My dissertation aims at understanding the financing and investment decisions of firms. It contains two
chapters.
Chapter One studies the currency composition of debt for firms in emerging economies. Using a dataset of
traded Mexican firms, I document two stylized facts about firms in the non-tradable sector: (i) they take on
large amounts of dollar-denominated debt and (ii) their earnings are not sensitive to the exchange rate. I
propose an explanation based on imperfect competition in the domestic goods market that reconciles these
seemingly contradictory empirical facts. First I develop a stylized model of production and financing for firms
in an open economy. I show that non-exporting firms are exposed to exchange rate risk because of the
presence of exporters in the economy, and that they hedge their currency exposure using dollar debt. An
extended model is used to quantify how much of the dollar debt in the data can be explained through this
channel. A calibrated version of the model can account for all of the dollar debt observed in the data.
Chapter Two investigates the relationship between the investment decisions of firms and their cost of
financing. Recent empirical work using panel data documents that, while the correlation of investment and
Tobin's Q is low, the correlation of investment and credit spreads is high. We propose an explanation for these
empirical findings, based on time-varying risk, i.e. stochastic volatility. In our model, firms finance investments
using defaultable debt as well as equity issuance, and they are subject to standard profitability shocks as well as
shocks to volatility. An increase in volatility leads to an increase in the probability of default and hence the
credit spread, while reducing investment and increasing equity value. This shock hence generates a negative
correlation between investment and credit spreads, and between investment and Q, helping the model match
the data.
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ABSTRACT
ESSAYS IN DYNAMIC CORPORATE FINANCE
Michael Michaux
Joao F. Gomes
My dissertation aims at understanding the financing and investment decisions of firms. It contains
two chapters.
Chapter One studies the currency composition of debt for firms in emerging economies. Using
a dataset of traded Mexican firms, I document two stylized facts about firms in the non-tradable
sector: (i) they take on large amounts of dollar-denominated debt and (ii) their earnings are not
sensitive to the exchange rate. I propose an explanation based on imperfect competition in the
domestic goods market that reconciles these seemingly contradictory empirical facts. First I develop
a stylized model of production and financing for firms in an open economy. I show that non-exporting
firms are exposed to exchange rate risk because of the presence of exporters in the economy, and
that they hedge their currency exposure using dollar debt. An extended model is used to quantify
how much of the dollar debt in the data can be explained through this channel. A calibrated version
of the model can account for all of the dollar debt observed in the data.
Chapter Two investigates the relationship between the investment decisions of firms and their
cost of financing. Recent empirical work using panel data documents that, while the correlation of
investment and Tobin’s Q is low, the correlation of investment and credit spreads is high. We propose
an explanation for these empirical findings, based on time-varying risk, i.e. stochastic volatility. In
our model, firms finance investments using defaultable debt as well as equity issuance, and they are
subject to standard profitability shocks as well as shocks to volatility. An increase in volatility leads
to an increase in the probability of default and hence the credit spread, while reducing investment
and increasing equity value. This shock hence generates a negative correlation between investment
and credit spreads, and between investment and Q, helping the model match the data.
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Chapter 1
Pass-through, Exposure, and the
Currency Composition of Debt
1.1 Introduction
Firms that contract debt in foreign currency rather than in domestic currency can create currency
exposures via balance sheet mismatches. These currency exposures can potentially lead to more
costly external financing, or even bankruptcy when the exchange rate depreciates sharply. Therefore
the currency composition of corporate debt is an important capital structure decision.
In this paper I use a panel dataset of Mexican firms traded on the Mexican Stock Market in the
last 10 years. I document two stylized facts about firms in the non-tradable sector: (i) they take on
large amounts of dollar-denominated debt and (ii) their earnings, defined as sales minus costs and
financing expenses, are not sensitive to the exchange rate. The first stylized fact is consistent with
the emerging markets literature, where mounting empirical evidence shows that firms in emerging
markets have a sizable amount of dollar-denominated debt1. The second empirical fact suggests that
firms are managing their currency exposure.
Several explanations for the high dollar indebtedness have been offered in the theoretical litera-
ture. Schneider and Tornell (2004) argue that implicit guarantees by the government induce firms to
borrow in dollars excessively. Expecting a bailout in the event of a large currency depreciation, firms
1See Bleakley and Cowan (2008), Allayannis and Ofek (2001), and Aguiar (2005)
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overexpose themselves to exchange rate fluctuations. The implicit guarantees by the government
provide some benefit to issuing large amounts of dollar debt. Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2001,
2003) argue that limited financial development in emerging markets led to firms taking on excessive
dollar debt. Specifically they show that when financial constraints affect borrowing and lending,
firms undervalue insuring against an exchange rate depreciation and therefore take on excessive dol-
lar debt. Both of these theories are based on the existence of benefits to issuing dollar debt, which
firms balance against the cost in the event of a large currency depreciation. In these models currency
mismatches of assets and liabilities arise in equilibrium, and therefore firms’ profits are exposed to
fluctuations in the exchange rate. These theories are consistent with the first stylized fact of high
dollar indebtedness. However they are in contradiction with the second stylized fact that earnings
of Mexican firms are not exposed to the exchange rate.
In this paper I propose an explanation that reconciles the seemingly contradictory empirical
facts that firms in the non-tradable sector issue large amounts of dollar debt but are hedged against
currency risk. I develop a model of firms in an open economy and show that non-exporting firms are
exposed to exchange rate risk because of the exporters in the economy, and that they hedge their
currency exposure using dollar debt. In the model, high dollar indebtedness is a direct result of an
optimal financing decision.
In the first section of the paper, I develop a stylized model of firms with imperfect competition
in the domestic goods market. The model features a local firm (or non-exporting firm) and an
exporting firm, each producing a differentiated good. The representative consumer in the domestic
market chooses an optimal bundle of goods and prices clear in the goods market. Unlike the local
firm, the exporting firm has the option to sell some of its production abroad. As the exchange rate
fluctuates, the foreign price in the domestic currency fluctuates as well, which induces the exporting
firm to adjust its domestic supply. Due to the imperfect competition, this affects all prices in the
domestic goods market. Thus the local firm has a positive “pass-through,” since changes in exchange
2
rates are passed onto the price of the non-tradable good in the domestic market. Both price and
profits for the local firm vary with the exchange rate. If the domestic goods market were perfectly
competitive, the exchange rate would not affect prices in the domestic market, and the local firm
would not be affected by the exporter’s decisions. This mechanism is present despite the fact that
firms have similar costs and that there are no shocks to the demand for their product in the domestic
market. The presence of pass-through in turn implies that firms’ profits are potentially sensitive to
the exchange rate. Managerial risk aversion creates a motive to smooth out dividends, so firms use
dollar debt to hedge their exchange rate exposure. Therefore the model yields an optimal currency
composition for debt.
In the next section, I use a panel dataset of Mexican firms traded on the Mexican Stock Market,
called the Bolsa Mexicana de Valores (BMV). I explore empirically the determinants of the currency
composition of debt, estimate the sales and earnings sensitivity to exchange rate, and test the
implications of the model. Regressions of the currency composition of debt on firm characteristics
show that local firms issue large fractions of their debt in dollars, and that industry dummies
provide additional information beyond firms’characteristics. Regressions of sales and earnings on
the exchange rate show that sales for local firms are sensitive to the exchange rate, but that their
earnings are not. This is evidence that local firms hedge the exposure of their sales effectively.
Additional regressions show that local firms in more concentrated industries (more imperfect goods
market) and with smaller market shares have higher shares of foreign debt. These results are in
agreement with the comparative statics of the model.
In the last section of the paper, I present a quantitative model that can be used to study
the effect of the goods market imperfection on the amounts of foreign debt issued by firms. I
incorporate a standard corporate finance model of the firm, similar in spirit to Cooley and Quadrini
(2001), Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005), and Gomes and Schmid (2009), into an industry
equilibrium with imperfectly competitive goods market. The model is fully dynamic and is extended
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to accommodate a continuum of firms. The heterogeneity between firms comes from an idiosyncratic
cost shock similar in spirit to Melitz (2003) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), making the decision
to export endogenous. I also add financial frictions in the form of costly equity issuances and
defaultable debt. Bankruptcy costs are incurred upon default and the interest expense on debt can
be deducted from taxable income. This extended model is used to quantify how much of the dollar
debt in the data can be accounted for by this pass-through channel due to imperfect competition in
the goods market. A calibrated version of the model can account for all of the dollar debt observed
in the data.
The model in this paper is similar in spirit to the model of Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002).
The authors develop a model of exporting firms under imperfect competition to study the interaction
between pass-through and exchange rate exposure. They study how changes in exchange rates affect
the relative competitiveness of firms in the goods market through their production costs. In contrast,
the model in this paper studies the domestic market and focuses on understanding how changes in
exchange rates affect pass-through and exchange rate exposure of all firms in the domestic market.
Local firms have a positive pass-through in the industry equilibrium, even though costs for all firms
in this economy are similar. In addition this paper addresses the optimal currency composition of
debt in such an economy, which is not considered in Bodnar, Dumas, and Marston (2002).
The paper is organized as follows. Section 1.2 presents and analyzes the stylized model. Section
1.3 describes the panel dataset of Mexican firms and tests the implications of the model. I present
an extended model in Section 1.4. This model is calibrated and used to quantify the value of hedging
using dollar debt in Section 1.5. Section 1.6 concludes the paper.
1.2 Stylized Model
This section presents a stylized model of production and financing for firms in an open economy. The
model features imperfect competition in the domestic goods market and managerial risk aversion.
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In this section I derive the pass-through policy and exchange rate exposure of firms, as well as the
optimal currency composition of corporate debt.
1.2.1 Environment
There are 2 types of firms in the economy. Type 1 represents an exporting firm that sells goods in
both the domestic and foreign markets. Type 2 represents a local firm that only sells goods in the
domestic market. These two firms can be interpreted as two firms in a given sector of the economy
where sectors are complements to one another. Alternatively, these firms can be thought of as two
sectors of the economy: the non-tradable sector and the tradable sector (or export sector). The local
firm can be thought as operating in a non-tradable sector of the economy or as a firm having large
costs of exporting, making it optimal to not export. The decision to export will be endogenous in
the extended model described in Section 1.4.
Time is discrete and there are 2 periods. The timing is as follows. In period 0, firms make their
financing decision, and in period 1, make their production and sales decisions. This timing is chosen
for clarity of exposition. The production decision could also be made in period 0 (along with the
financing decision) at the cost of more complicated algebra, but the results would not be affected.
The financing decision consists of choosing how much domestic (peso) and foreign (dollar) debt to
issue. More formally, domestic debt for a firm of type i is denoted by bid ≥ 0, while foreign debt
is denoted by bif ≥ 0. The debt is default free and is repaid in period 1. The debt is priced by
risk-neutral investors, thus the debt price is equal to the common subjective discount rate β ∈ [0, 1]
of investors. The production decision consists of choosing the quantity of goods to produce and the
allocation of sales in the domestic and foreign markets. Each firm i produces a differentiated good.
xi ≥ 0 denotes sales in the domestic market while x∗i ≥ 0 denotes sales in the foreign market. The
good produced by firm i (or type i) will be referred to as good i as each firm produces a single
differentiated good.
Each good i sells at price pi ≥ 0 in the domestic market and good 1 sells at price p∗1 ≥ 0 in the
5
foreign market. Each price is denominated in units of local currency, that is pi is in pesos and p
∗
1 is
in dollars. The domestic goods market is a noncooperative duopoly and domestic prices pi satisfy
the representative consumer optimal decision. The foreign market is perfectly competitive so the
exporting firm is a price taker. In other words, the foreign price p∗1 is given and firm 1 can sell any
quantity of goods at that price.
The uncertainty in this economy comes solely from the real exchange rate in period 1. It is
defined as the price of 1 dollar in peso and is denoted e1. The exchange rate in period 0 is set at e¯.
The exchange rate in period 1 is distributed on a bounded and non-negative support. Its expectation
is equal to e¯ and its volatility is denoted σe.
1.2.2 Preferences and Demand
The utility function for the domestic consumer is CES, as in Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). The con-
sumer’s problem is given by,
U = max
x1,x2
[αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2]
1
ρ , (1.1)
s.t. y = p1x1 + p2x2, (1.2)
where y ≥ 0 is the total expenditure by the consumer, α ∈ [0, 1] is a preference parameter, and
ρ ∈ [0, 1] is a parameter that controls the substitutability between goods. The goods become perfect
complements when ρ goes to 0, whereas they are perfect substitutes when ρ = 1.
The inverse demand functions in the domestic market are,
p1(x1, x2) =
αx
(ρ−1)
1 y
αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2
, (1.3)
p2(x1, x2) =
(1− α)x(ρ−1)2 y
αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2
. (1.4)
The own and cross-price derivatives of these demand functions are negative, i.e. pii < 0 and pij < 0.
This property means that an increase in the quantity of either good will lead to a decline in prices.
The market shares of the local and exporting firms will be important measures of size in this
model. Define the market share of the exporting firm in the domestic market by λ. Using equation
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(1.3), the market share can be expressed as,
λ ≡ p1x1
y
=
αxρ1
αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2
. (1.5)
Conversely the market share of the local firm is (1 − λ). Note that the market share λ ∈ (0, 1), as
both firms are selling in the domestic market.
The own and cross reciprocals of elasticities of demand for both goods can be expressed as
functions of the elasticity of substitution between goods and market shares as follows, x1p1
∂p1
∂x1
x2
p1
∂p1
∂x2
x1
p2
∂p2
∂x1
x2
p2
∂p2
∂x2
 = [ ρ(1− λ)− 1 −ρ(1− λ)−ρλ ρλ− 1
]
. (1.6)
As market shares for both firms are never zero, a rise in the substitutability of goods (higher ρ)
raises the magnitude of the cross price reciprocal of elasticities and lowers the magnitude of the own
price reciprocal of elasticities.
1.2.3 Production and Sales Decisions
For simplicity, firms incur no cost of production but they face a capacity constraint in their pro-
duction denoted by x¯ > 0. Profits in local currency, denoted by pi, are given by the solution to
the production and sales problems. Firms choose their production and sales after they observe the
exchange rate e. Firms decide on the scale of production (x + x∗) and the quantities to sell in
each market (i.e. x in the domestic market and x∗ in the foreign market) such that they maximize
revenues in local currency. The problem for the local firm is given by,
pi2(e) = max
x2
p2(x1, x2)x2,
s.t. x2 ≤ x¯2.
This problem is trivial to solve. The local firm does not incur any production costs and its own
elasticity of demand is greater than one, therefore it will want to sell as many units as possible. The
domestic production for the local firm is thus x2 = x¯2. The problem for the exporting firm is given
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by,
pi1(e) = max
x1,x∗1
p1(x1, x2)x1 + ep
∗
1x
∗
1,
s.t. x1 + x
∗
1 ≤ x¯1.
It is straightforward to see that the exporting firm will also produce at capacity as it incurs no
production costs. Thus the allocation of sales is the only non-trivial decision the exporting firm has
to make. The first-order condition for domestic sales x1 prescribes that the exporting firm should
equalize the marginal benefit of selling one more unit in the domestic market to the marginal benefit
in the foreign market. The following lemma formalizes this intuition.
Lemma 1.2.1 (Export Decision). Let x˜1(e) be the solution to f(x1, e) = 0, where f : R+×R+ → R
is defined by,
f(x1, e) = ρ(1− λ(x1, x¯2))p1(x1, x¯2)− ep∗1.
The function x˜1(e) is decreasing in its argument,
∂ log(x˜1)
∂ log(e)
= − 1
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) .
Proof: See Appendix A.
Lemma 1.2.1 states that x˜1 is the quantity of good sold in the domestic market that equalizes
marginal benefits of selling one more unit in domestic and foreign goods markets. When this level of
domestic sales is feasible, that is when this level is lower than the production capacity, the exporting
firm sells x˜1 domestically, and sells the remainder of the production (x¯1− x˜1) in the foreign market.
If this level is higher than the production capacity, the exporting firm will not sell in the foreign
market. The exporting firm will sell all of its output in the domestic market and the economy will
have no exports. Figure 1.1 conveys this mechanism graphically. It depicts the marginal benefit
curves for the the exporting firm in both the domestic and foreign markets. These curves graph the
marginal benefit of selling one more unit in the goods market as a function of quantity supplied, x1.
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Figure 1.1: Exporting Firm’s Marginal Benefit Curves for the Domestic and Foreign
Markets.
Lemma 1.2.1 also states that x˜1 is decreasing in the exchange rate e. It means that domestic
sales fall when the peso depreciates. Figure 1.1 shows the effect of an exchange rate increase (i.e.
depreciation of the peso against the dollar). First note that the marginal benefit of selling one more
unit in the foreign market is equal to the foreign price in peso. The foreign price in dollar is constant,
thus when the exchange rate increases, the foreign price in peso increases as well. The marginal
benefit curve for the foreign market shifts up (i.e. the dashed line) and intersects the domestic
marginal benefit curve at a higher marginal benefit and a lower value for x1. This illustrates why
domestic sales decrease when the peso depreciates. As foreign prospects improve, the exporting firm
reduces domestic sales to sell more of its production abroad. This substitution effect in the sales of
the exporting firm is at the heart of the mechanism for the transmission of exchange rate fluctuations
to the local firm. The following proposition formalizes the optimal sales policy for both firms.
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Proposition 1.2.2 (Optimal Sales Policy). The optimal sales policies for the exporting firm are
given by,
x1(e) =
{
x˜1(e) if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
x¯1 if x˜1 > x¯1,
x∗1(e) = (x¯1 − x˜1(e)) 1{x˜1≤x¯1}.
The optimal sales policy for the local firm is given by,
x2 = x¯2.
Proof: See Appendix A.
Following the exchange rate literature, pass-through is defined as the elasticity of price with
respect to the exchange rate. It is denoted by ηi for firm i and formally expressed as follows,
ηi ≡ ∂ log pi
∂ log e
.
Pass-through is a measure of the extent to which a firm “passes through” the changes in exchange
rates onto the price it charges in the goods market. In this model, we are interested in understanding
how much of the exchange rate changes are passed onto the prices of both goods in the domestic
market. The dollar price of the exported good is independent of the exchange rate by assumption,
so its pass-through is zero. The following proposition gives prices and pass-throughs for both firms
in closed-form.
Proposition 1.2.3 (Prices and Pass-through). The price and pass-through for the exporting firm
are given by,
p1(e) =
{ αx˜1(e)(ρ−1) y
αx˜1(e)ρ+(1−α)x¯ρ2 if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
αx¯
(ρ−1)
1 y
αx¯ρ1+(1−α)x¯ρ2 if x˜1 > x¯1,
η1(e) = η 1{x˜1≤x¯1},
where η ≡ 1−ρ(1−λ)1−ρ(1−2λ) .
10
The price and pass-through for the local firm are given by,
p2(e) =
{
(1−α)x¯(ρ−1)2 y
αx˜1(e)ρ+(1−α)x¯ρ2 , if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
(1−α)x¯(ρ−1)2 y
αx¯ρ1+(1−α)x¯ρ2 , if x˜1 > x¯1,
η2(e) = (1− η) 1{x˜1≤x¯1}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The pass-through for the exporting firm, denoted by η1, is equal to η, which can be expressed as
a function of two parameters: the elasticity of substitution ρ and the market share λ. It is interesting
to note that η ∈ [1/2, 1]. This means that the price of good 1 in the domestic market will always
respond to changes in the exchange rate. This result is intuitive and certainly not very surprising.
Changes in the foreign market price (in peso) will affect the sales decisions of the exporting firm,
and consequently affect the price of its good in the domestic market. However, the novel result
is the fact that the sales decisions of the exporting firm affect prices of all goods in the domestic
market. Therefore pass-through for the local firm, denoted by η2, is non zero. It is equal to (1− η)
and lies in the interval [0, 1/2]. This effect is due to the assumption of imperfect competition in the
domestic goods market. If the domestic goods market were perfectly competitive, prices would not
react to changes in the supply of any goods and, as a result, pass-through for all firms would be zero.
Thus the exchange rate fluctuations are transmitted to the price of good 2 because of the domestic
sales of firm 1, due to the imperfect competition in the domestic goods market. In the exchange
rate exposure literature, pass-through generally results from a change in relative costs of production
between firms. In this case a change in exchange rate leads to a change in the opportunity cost for
the exporting firm. Thus this model highlights a channel for pass-through that links firms in the
tradable sector to firms in the non-tradable sector.
Figure 1.2 plots the pass-through for both firms versus the market share λ. A higher market
share (higher λ) leads to a lower pass-through for the exporting firm, but a higher pass-through for
the local firm. This is due to the fact that if the exporter has a higher market share, a change in
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its domestic sales will affect its own price less than it will affect the price of the local good. As a
result, a larger exporting firm will be able to pass more of the exchange rate fluctuations onto the
local firm.
Figure 1.2: Pass-through versus the Market Share. The left panel plots the pass-through for
the exporting firm. The right panel plots the pass-through for the local firm.
Figure 1.2 plots the pass-through for both firms for different values of the elasticity of substitution
ρ. The solid (blue) line shows the case of ρ = 0.05, where goods are highly complementary. The
dashed (red) line shows the case of ρ = 0.95, where goods are highly substitutable. These graphs
show that a higher degree of substitution between goods (higher ρ) leads to a lower pass-through
for the exporting firm, but a higher pass-through for the local firm. As discussed earlier, this is due
to the fact that an increase in substitutability raises the magnitude of the cross price elasticities
and lowers the magnitude of the own price elasticities. Thus a change in domestic sales x1 by the
exporting firm will affect the price of good 1 less and the price of good 2 more. The following
proposition summarizes the comparative statics.
Proposition 1.2.4 (Pass-through: Comparative Statics). The comparative statics for the pass-
through of the exporting firm are given by,
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∂ log η1
∂ log λ
(e) =
−ρλ(1− ρ)
(1− ρ(1− λ))(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)) 1{x˜1≤x¯1} ≤ 0,
∂ log η1
∂ log ρ
(e) =
−ρλ
(1− ρ(1− λ))(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)) 1{x˜1≤x¯1} ≤ 0.
The comparative statics for the pass-through of the local firm are given by,
∂ log η2
∂ log λ
(e) =
1− ρ
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) 1{x˜1≤x¯1} ≥ 0,
∂ log η2
∂ log ρ
(e) =
1
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) 1{x˜1≤x¯1} ≥ 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The quantity of interest for the financing decision is not pass-through but rather the exchange
rate exposure. It is defined as the elasticity of profits with respect to the exchange rate. It is denoted
by δi for firm i and formally expressed as δi ≡ ∂ log pii∂ log e . Profits and exchange rate exposures are given
for both firms in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2.5 (Profits and Exchange Rate Exposure). Profits and exchange rate exposure for
the exporting firm are given by,
pi1(e) =
{
p1x˜1 + ep
∗
1(x¯1 − x˜1), if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
p1x¯1, if x˜1 > x¯1,
δ1(e) = χ 1{x˜1≤x¯1}.
where χ ≡ ep∗1(x¯1−x˜1)p1x˜1+ep∗1(x¯1−x˜1) is the share of foreign profits. Profits and exchange rate exposure for the
local firm are given by,
pi2(e) = p2x¯2,
δ2(e) = (1− η) 1{x˜1≤x¯1}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The exchange rate exposure for the exporting firm is equal to the share of its profits that is
foreign. As exports become a larger proportion of total profits, the exchange rate exposure rises.
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Specifically, the exposure asymptotes to 100% as exports become the main source of profits, i.e. χ
goes to 1 as x¯1 goes to infinity. The converse holds true: as exports become a smaller portion of
total profits, the exporting firm sees its exposure becoming very small. As the exporting firm is
able to substitute sales between the domestic and foreign markets, its exchange rate exposure can
potentially be very small. On the other hand, the local firm does not have the ability to do so.
Because of the fixed scale of its operations, its exchange rate exposure is equal to its pass-through.
As described previously, this means that the local firm can potentially have a large exchange rate
exposure, as can be seen in Figure 1.2.
1.2.4 Financing Decision
One of the objectives of this model is to derive the optimal capital structure for firms that are exposed
to exchange rate fluctuations, as described in the previous section. As the hedging literature has
shown, imperfections in the financial markets, a convex tax schedule, or agency between managers
and shareholders are factors that will induce firms to hedge their cashflows. Because the model
presented in this section is parsimonious, the demand for hedging will be introduced by assuming
that firms are run by risk-averse managers. Although it is not the only way to create a hedging
behavior, it is an effective way to do so in a two periods setting. A more general economy with
financing frictions is presented in the extended model described in Section 1.4.
Firms are run by risk-averse managers, that is managers maximize the discounted sum of the
utility of dividends. The utility function u : R+ → R satisfies (i) u′ > 0, (ii) u′′ < 0, and (iii)
the Inada conditions. The managers have the same discount rate as the investors. The financing
problem for both firms is given by,
V = max
bd,bf
u(d0) + βE [u(d1)] ,
s.t. d0 = β(bd + e¯bf ),
d1 = pi(e1)− bd − e1bf .
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In period 0, firms issue domestic and foreign debt at the discount price β. In period 1, the exchange
rate e1 is observed and firms produce pi(e1) and repay their domestic bd and foreign debt bf . The
optimal debt satisfies the Euler equations,
u′(β(bd + e¯bf )) = E [u′ (pi(e1)− bd − e1bf )] ,
e¯u′(β(bd + e¯bf )) = E [e1u′ (pi(e1)− bd − e1bf )] .
The Euler equations simply state that the manager wants to equalize marginal utilities of dividends
across time, as well as across states. The optimal financing policy is similar for both firms, and
given in the following proposition.
Proposition 1.2.6 (Optimal Financing Policy). If the volatility of the exchange rate is small, i.e.
σe is in a neighborhood of zero, then the optimal financing policies can be approximated to a first
order. The optimal financing policy for both firms is,
bd ≈ pi(e¯)
1 + β
− e¯ ∂pi
∂e
(e¯),
bf ≈ ∂pi
∂e
(e¯).
Proof: See Appendix A.
First it is interesting to note that the degree of risk aversion does not enter the choice of debt.
As long as the utility function is strictly concave, managers have an incentive to hedge cashflows
regardless of the extent of their risk aversion. The optimal amount of domestic debt is such that the
cashflow of the project in period 1 in distributed in both periods. The optimal amount of dollar debt
is simply the expected sensitivity of profits to exchange rate. This result resembles the textbook
prescription for firms to hedge their exchange rate economic exposure. Therefore firms use domestic
debt to smooth out cashflows over time and use foreign debt to smooth cashflows across states of
the world.
In order to relate the financing policies to the data, it is convenient to introduce a new variable:
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the share of foreign debt. It is denoted by ω, and defined as follows,
ω ≡ e¯bf
bd + e¯bf
.
Using the expressions for exchange rate exposure in Proposition 1.2.5, the following proposition
yields the optimal share of foreign debt.
Proposition 1.2.7 (Share of Foreign Debt). The share of foreign debt for the exporting firm is,
ω1 = (1 + β) δ1(e¯) = (1 + β) χ(e¯) 1{x˜1(e¯)≤x¯1}.
The share of foreign debt for the local firm is,
ω2 = (1 + β) δ2(e¯) = (1 + β) (1− η(e¯)) 1{x˜1(e¯)≤x¯1}.
Proof: See Appendix A.
The first result to notice is that shares of foreign debt for both firms can take values in a wide
interval, i.e. ω1 ∈ [0, 1 + β] ⊆ [0, 2], and ω2 ∈ [0, 1+β2 ] ⊆ [0, 1]. Therefore both firms can potentially
take on large shares of foreign debt.
The share of foreign debt for the local firm increases with the substitutability of goods. If goods
are more substitutable, the domestic consumer is more willing to substitute the exported good with
the local good. This effect increases the sensitivity of profits to the exchange rate for the local firm.
As its profits become more sensitive, the local firm takes on higher shares of foreign debt in order
to hedge its profits against exchange rate movements.
The share of foreign debt for the local firm increases with the exporter’s domestic market share.
If the exporter has a higher market share, the high domestic supply of the exporter drives down
the own reciprocal of price elasticity of good 1 (i.e. flatter price schedule p1(x1)). The exporter’s
response to an exchange rate change will be higher in magnitude (i.e. more x1 are withdrawn for a
given percentage price increase). As a result, the local firm will see a higher change in its price p2
and thus profit pi2. This effect increases the sensitivity of the local firm to the exchange rate.
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1.3 Empirical Evidence
This section presents the panel dataset of Mexican firms that has been used. First I used simple
regressions to understand the determinants of debt currency composition for the whole sample of
firms. Then I estimate the sensitivity of sales and profits to the exchange rate for local firms. Finally
I test specific implications of the model for local firms.
1.3.1 Description of the Data
The panel dataset has been constructed by gathering items from the balance sheets and the cash
flow statements for a set of Mexican firms traded on the Mexican Stock Market (Bolsa Mexicana
de Valores). The data items are recorded from the fourth quarter of 1999 to the second quarter of
2009. As it is customary, financial and insurance firms are excluded from the sample.
The dataset is composed of 99 firms, totaling 2,608 firm/quarter observations. It contains the fol-
lowing balance sheet items: book assets, book debt (including current liabilities and long term debt),
decomposed into foreign (dollar-denominated) debt and domestic (peso-denominated) debt. The
statements of cash flow contain quarterly figures for total sales, decomposed into foreign and domes-
tic sales. These data items will allow the construction of the variables such as leverage (debt/assets),
share of foreign debt, share of foreign sales, and asset turnover. The percentage of dollar debt will
be the ratio of dollar denominated debt over total debt. The percentage of foreign sales is the ratio
of foreign sales over total sales. Asset turnover is defined as the ratio of total sales over total assets.
Table 1.1 reports the summary statistics for these variables. Panel A reports the data in levels in
millions of Mexican pesos, and panel B reports the variables relevant to the empirical analysis.
Firms are classified into different industries of operation. Appendix B lists all the firms traded on
the BMV broken down by industry. The industries include the following: Materials, Manufacturing,
Consumer Goods and Services, Consumer Durables, Health Care, and Telecommunication Services.
Each of the 6 industries is broken down further into sectors, for a total of 15 sectors.
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Panel A: Levels
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Assets 2,608 25,200 52,600 96.3 624,000
Sales 2,608 4,780 9,418 0 94,400
Domestic Sales 2,608 3,546 6,800 0 72,700
Foreign Sales 2,608 1,239 4,488 0 59,200
Debt 2,608 11,100 27,100 7.5 316,000
Domestic Debt 2,608 4,766 10,000 0 75,700
foreign Debt 2,608 6,354 19,500 0 276,000
Panel B: Ratios
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Share of Foreign Debt 2,608 0.37 0.32 0 1
Share of Foreign Sales 2,608 0.15 0.21 0 0.86
Debt/Assets 2,608 0.38 0.20 0.005 1.69
Total Sales/Assets 2,608 0.21 0.14 0 1.03
log(Assets) 2,608 15.83 1.63 11.47 20.25
Panel C: Local versus Exporting Firms
Firms Local Exporter
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Obs. Mean Std. Dev.
Share of Foreign Debt 923 0.15 0.20 1,685 0.49 0.31
Share of Foreign Sales 923 0 0 1,685 0.24 0.22
Debt/Assets 923 0.30 0.18 1,685 0.43 0.20
Total Sales/Assets 923 0.23 0.17 1,685 0.20 0.11
log(Assets) 923 15.19 1.50 1,685 16.17 1.60
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics. This table reports the summary statistics for the main variables.
Panel A reports the raw data in millions of Mexican pesos. Panel B reports ratios. Panel C reports
variables for local and exporting firms. The data consists of 99 traded Mexican firms, for the years
1999 to 2009. Source: Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.
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Figure 1.3 plots the share of foreign debt versus the share of foreign sales for each firm. As it
has been documented empirically in the emerging markets literature, there is a positive correlation
between the share of foreign debt and the share of foreign sales. This observation is consistent with
the view that firms engage in hedging their currency exposure. In addition the graph shows that
many non-exporters have sizable shares of foreign debt.
Figure 1.3: Share of Foreign Debt versus the Share of Foreign Sales. The data consists
of Mexican firms traded on the Mexican Stock Market, for the years 1999 to 2009. Source: Bolsa
Mexicana de Valores.
1.3.2 Currency Composition of Debt
A simple regression analysis is conducted in this subsection. I run regressions of firms’ share of
foreign debt on firms’ characteristics. A natural regressor in this context is the share of foreign
sales. In addition I use typical regressors in the empirical corporate finance literature, such as firm
size, leverage, and asset turnover. A dummy variable that indicates whether firms have ADR listings
in the NYSE is used to control for access to international markets. Industry dummies are used to
control for the industry-specific effects. The regression results are summarized in Table 1.2.
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Share of foreign Debt (1) (2) (3) (4)
Share of Foreign Sales 0.926*** 0.789*** 0.870*** 0.805***
(47.37) (39.23) (40.77) (37.30)
Debt/Assets 0.374*** 0.336***
(13.91) (13.26)
log(Assets) 0.012*** 0.005*
(4.27) (1.75)
Sales/Assets -0.521*** -0.424***
(-18.30) (-11.67)
ADR Dummy 0.026** -0.021*
(2.05) (-1.65)
Constant 0.224*** 0.018
(37.08) (0.41)
Industry Dummy No No Yes Yes
R-squared 0.384 0.494 0.495 0.546
N 2,608 2,608 2,608 2,608
Table 1.2: Regression Results. Level of significance: * p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, using
robust standard errors.
The first main result from this regression analysis is that the share of foreign sales is statistically
significant at the 1% level in all the regression specifications. This relationship is robust even when
controlling for all firm characteristics, and industry and quarter dummies. This result confirms the
broad result in the emerging markets empirical literature that exporting firms hedge the currency
exposure that originates from their export activities. However the first regression (column 1) shows
that the average share of foreign debt for firms with no exports is about 22%. This seems to be a
puzzle as these firms have no direct exposure to the exchange rate.
Depending on the industry within which firms are operating, access to financing, sales, and
cost of production may have different sensitivities to exchange rate fluctuations. These differences
across industries will impact optimal debt composition in a systematic way. Figure 1.4 plots the
percentage of foreign debt versus the percentage foreign sales, for each industry. These plots indicate
that the type of industry seems to play a part in determining the optimal debt composition. Firms
in the materials and telecommunications industries tend to have more dollar debt than firms in the
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Figure 1.4: Share of Foreign Debt versus the Share of Foreign Sales by Sector. The data
consists of Mexican firms traded on the Mexican Stock Market, for the years 1999 to 2009. Source:
Bolsa Mexicana de Valores.
consumer durables and health care industries. The addition of industry dummies (i.e. columns 3
and 4 of Table 1.2) increases the explanatory power. This confirms the presence of the exchange
rate sensitivity channel, acting at the industry level.
1.3.3 Estimation of the Exchange Rate Sensitivities
The time dimension of the panel permits the estimation of the foreign exchange rate exposure of
firm earnings. The exchange rate sensitivity of sales and earnings can be estimated for each firm
by running a regression of sales and earnings on the log of the exchange rate. Because accounting
data are noisy, the exposure will not be estimated at the firm level, but rather firms will be pooled
together. Firm fixed-effect regressions using only firms with no foreign sales are used to estimate
the exposure of sales and earnings, defined as sales minus costs minus financing expenses, for local
firms.
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Sales and profits over a 10-year period have trends, thus instead of regressing the level of sales and
earnings, their ratio over assets will be used as independent variables. The regression specification
is given by,
Yit = αi + βe log(et) + βGDP log(GDPt) + βXit + εit, (1.7)
where the independent variable will be the ratio of sales over assets in the first regression (column 1
of Table 1.3) and the ratio of earnings over assets in the second regression (column 2 of Table 1.3).
The aggregate states are included in the regressions: exchange rate, log(e), as well as the residuals of
the Hodrick-Prescott filter of the logarithm of the Mexican GDP, denoted by log(GDP ). In addition,
firm characteristics Xit are used as control variables: leverage, size, and ADR dummy. In addition a
quarter dummy is added to control for seasonality. Table 1.3 reports the regression results for local
firms. It can be seen that sales have a statistically significant positive sensitivity to the exchange
rate, however earnings do not. These results are evidence that local firms are in fact hedging their
exchange rate risk effectively, insulating their earnings from exchange rate fluctuations.
(1) (2) (3)
Sales/Assets Operating Income/Assets Earnings/Assets
log(e) 0.067*** 0.006* -0.009
(6.34) (1.65) (-1.13)
log(GDP) 0.088*** 0.036*** 0.033**
(4.76) (5.15) (2.32)
Debt/Assets -0.006 -0.021*** -0.059***
(-0.62) (-6.37) (-10.04)
log(Assets) -0.016*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(-5.92) (5.48) (6.50)
ADR Dummy 0.0008 -0.002 -0.0007
(0.08) (-0.64) (-0.18)
Firm Fixed Effect Yes Yes Yes
Quarter Dummy Yes Yes Yes
R-squared (within) 0.053 0.030 0.037
R-squared (between) 0.011 0.309 0.369
N 2,608 2,608 2,608
Table 1.3: Regression Results. These regressions use local firms only. Level of significance: *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, using robust standard errors.
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1.3.4 Testable Model Implications
The model argues that the presence of imperfect competition in the domestic goods market creates
a link between exporting and local firms. I construct the Herfindahl index of each industry (and
sector) and use it as a measure of market imperfection. The model also predicts that a higher market
share will lead to a lower share of foreign debt for the local firm. I construct the market share of
each local firm in order to test directly for this model implication.
I add both the market share and Herfindahl index variables to the regressions of share of foreign
debt, using only local firms. The sign and significance of these variables are used to assess the
presence and the magnitude of the effects predicted by the model. Using the panel dimension of
the data, market share of firms and the Herfindahl index of each industry (and sector) can be
constructed, for each quarter. The market share of firm i in industry j, at time t is defined as
follows,
(Market Share)it =
(Domestic Sales)it∑
i ∈ industry(j)(Domestic Sales)it
, (1.8)
where Sd,it is peso sales for firm i in the domestic market. The Herfindahl index for industry (or
sector) j at time t is defined as follows,
(Herfindahl Index)jt =
∑
i ∈ industry(j)
(
(Market Share)it
)2
. (1.9)
The model predicts that market imperfection will lead local firms to take on higher shares of
foreign debt. Therefore, as market imperfection rises with the Herfindahl index, an increase in
the Herfindahl index leads to an increase in the share of dollar debt for local firms. The estimated
coefficient on the Herfindahl index should be positive. The model predicts that an increase in market
share for the local firms will lead to a lower share of foreign debt, thus the estimated coefficient on
the market share should be negative. Table 1.4 reports the regression results for local firms. The
sign of the estimated coefficients on the Herfindahl index and the market share are in line with what
the model predicted. The statistical significance is stronger at the sector level, but still consistent
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Share of foreign Debt Predicted Sign (1) (2) (3)
Debt/Assets 0.085 0.118 0.170*
(1.38) (1.49) (1.76)
log(Assets) 0.006 0.023* 0.027***
(1.10) (1.94) (3.43)
Sales/Assets -0.407*** -0.168* -0.293***
(-6.48) (-1.71) (-4.20)
ADR Dummy -0.019 -0.010 -0.010
(-0.44) (-0.20) (-0.22)
Constant 0.119 -0.399* -0.249**
(1.27) (-1.81) (-2.00)
Market Share (−) -0.004 -0.267***
(-1.29) (-3.35)
Herfindahl Index (+) 0.377*** 0.162*
(3.69) (1.68)
Level Industry Sector
N 6 15
R-squared 0.112 0.203 0.174
N 923 540 580
Table 1.4: Regression Results. These regressions use local firms only. Level of significance: *
p < 0.1, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01, using robust standard errors.
with the predictions at the industry level. These results are in accordance with the model.
1.4 Quantitative Model
This section presents an industry equilibrium of firms that make production and financing decisions.
This model can be thought of as an extension of the stylized model presented in a previous section.
The model is fully dynamic and has been extended to accommodate a continuum of firms. The
heterogeneity between firms comes from an idiosyncratic cost shock similar in spirit to Melitz (2003),
thus the decision to export is endogenous in this model. Financial frictions have been added, in the
form of costly equity issuances and defaultable debt. Bankruptcy costs are incurred upon default and
the interest expense on debt can be deducted from taxable income. These ingredients are standard
in the corporate finance literature2. Such a framework can be used to quantify the effect of imperfect
2See Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005), and Gomes and Schmid (2009)
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competition in the domestic goods market on firms’ share of foreign debt.
1.4.1 Preferences
Preferences are defined over a continuum of differentiated goods indexed by i ∈ Ω. All domestic
consumers share the same utility function given by,
U =
(∫
i∈Ω
xρi di
) 1
ρ
, (1.10)
where xi represents the consumption level of each variety i. The parameter ρ ∈ [0, 1] governs the
elasticity of substitution between each good. Let X denote the aggregate good,
X ≡
(∫
i∈Ω
xρi di
) 1
ρ
. (1.11)
This consumer problem yields a set of domestic price schedules pi (i.e. demand curves) for each
variety i,
pi(xi, X) = y x
ρ−1
i X
−ρ, i ∈ Ω, (1.12)
where y is the total expenditure in the domestic market. Note that price of variety i is decreasing
in the supply of both its own quantity and in the quantity of aggregate good supplied. The case of
perfect substitutes is obtained by taking the limit of parameter ρ to one. The demand curve for the
homogeneous good is simply p(X) = y X−1.
Consumers in the foreign economy value good i according to an exogenous demand curve, denoted
by p∗i (x
∗
i ). This economy is thus a small open economy exporting to a large open economy.
1.4.2 Firm Problem
The dynamic programming problem for firm i is to choose domestic debt bˆ′id, foreign debt bˆ
′
if ,
domestic and foreign sales xi and x
∗
i , and a default policy to maximize the present value of dividends.
The exchange rate e and the idiosyncratic cost shock zi are exogenous shocks.
Firms can choose the scale of the operation instantaneously but incur a convex cost of production.
Firms can sell its production in the domestic market and in the foreign market. The sales are denoted
25
by xi and x
∗
i , respectively. Profits for firm i are given by the following program,
pii(zi, e) = max
xi,x∗i
pixi + ep
∗
i x
∗
i −
η1
η2
exp(zi)(xi + x
∗
i )
η2 − f∗ 1{x∗i>0} − f,
where η1 > 0 and η2 > 1 are parameters of the cost function, f
∗ is a fixed cost paid if the firm
exports, f is a fixed cost of operation, and p∗i is the price (in foreign currency units) of the good
sold in the foreign market.
Firms have access to international lenders and can borrow in the form of one-period debt con-
tracts. Domestic debt is denominated in local currency units, while foreign debt is denominated
in foreign currency units. The coupon rate for a newly issued domestic bond is denoted c′id, while
the coupon for the foreign bond is c′if . Both bonds will be priced competitively by international
investors assuming that markets are complete.
Profits are taxed at a rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and interest expense can be deducted from taxable income.
The dividend for the firm is defined as the sum of after-tax profits and new debt issues, net of debt
repayment,
d˜i = (1− τ)pii(zi, e) + bˆ′id + ebˆ′if − bˆid(1 + (1− τ)c′id)− ebˆif (1 + (1− τ)c′if ),
Financing frictions are present in the form of costly equity issuances. Following Gomes (2001),
equity can be issued at a proportional cost λ, that is dividend net of equity issuance is given by,
di = (1 + λ1{d˜i<0})d˜i,
where 1{d˜i<0} is the indicator function of strictly negative dividends, i.e. 1{d˜i<0} = 1 if d˜i < 0 (and
0 otherwise).
The value of the firm continuing operations is given by,
Vi(bˆid, bˆif , s) = max
bˆ′id,bˆ
′
if ,xi,x
∗
i
di + E
[
md(s, s
′) max
(
0, Vi(bˆ
′
id, bˆ
′
if , s
′)
)]
,
where md(s, s
′) is the stochastic discount factor that firms take as given. The vector s contains all
the exogenous state variables in the economy. Specifically, the exchange rate e and the idiosyncratic
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cost shock zi are included in the exogenous state vector. The transition function for s will be
described in detail in Section 1.4.4.
1.4.3 International Markets and Lenders
This model assumes the existence of complete markets. This assumption allows the consideration
of only one pricing kernel, in this case the domestic one. In other words, the foreign pricing kernel
is given by,
mf (s, s
′) = md(s, s′)
e′
e
.
There is a continuum of competitive lenders. The emerging economy is small in comparison to the
international markets, thus the international lenders pricing kernel mf (s, s
′) is taken as exogenous.
Any debt contract has to satisfy the international lenders’ Euler equation. Risky dollar debt bˆ′if will
be supplied to firm i at a coupon rate c′if such that,
bˆ′if = E
[
md(s, s
′)
e′
e
{
(1 + c′if )bˆ
′
if 1
′ + ξ
e′(1 + c′if )bˆ
′
if
(1 + c′id)bˆ
′
id + e
′(1 + c′if )bˆ
′
if
pi′i + f
∗ + f
e′
(1− 1′)
}]
,
where 1′ is the indicator function for the decision to continue operations, that is if V ′i ≥ 0. The
bankruptcy costs are captured by the parameter ξ ∈ [0, 1], which represents the percentage of current
profits that is recovered by debtholders after the firm is sold or reorganized. Similarly lenders will
supply risky peso debt bˆ′id to firm i at a coupon rate c
′
id such that,
bˆ′id = E
[
md(s, s
′)
{
(1 + c′id)bˆ
′
id 1
′ + ξ
(1 + c′id)bˆ
′
id
(1 + c′id)bˆ
′
id + e
′(1 + c′if )bˆ
′
if
(pi′i + f
∗ + f)(1− 1′)
}]
.
Define b to be debt inclusive of interest payment and net of tax shield subsidy,
bid ≡ (1 + (1− τ)cid)bˆid, bif ≡ (1 + (1− τ)cif )bˆif .
The pricing equations can be rewritten as follows,
bˆ′if =
E
[
md(s, s
′) e
′
e
{
1
1−τ b
′
if 1
′ + ξ
e′b′if
b′id+e
′b′if
pi′i+f
∗+f
e′ (1− 1′)
}]
1 + τ1−τ E
[
md(s, s′) e
′
e 1
′] ,
bˆ′id =
E
[
md(s, s
′)
{
1
1−τ b
′
id 1
′ + ξ b
′
id
b′id+e
′b′if
(pi′i + f
∗ + f)(1− 1′)
}]
1 + τ1−τ E [md(s, s′)1
′]
.
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1.4.4 Dynamics of the Shocks
The exchange rate process is the only source of uncertainty at the aggregate level. The exchange
rate is exogenous from the point of view of the firms. This paper does not take a stand on how it is
determined. All firms face idiosyncratic shocks to their cost, denoted by zi.
In addition to these shocks, the exchange rate from the previous period is also required. Thus
the vector of exogenous state, denoted by s, is defined as s ≡ (zi, e, e−1).
1.4.5 Recursive Formulation of the Firm Problem
For computational reasons, it is convenient to rewrite the problem in terms of the firm’s total debt
b and its share of foreign debt ω, instead of the domestic debt bd and the foreign debt bf . Define,
ω′ ≡ eb
′
f
b′d + eb
′
f
and b′ ≡ b′d + eb′f .
Dividend can be rewritten as follows,
di = (1 + λ1{di<0})
{
(1− τ)pii(zi, e) + q′ib′i −
(
1− ωi + e
e−1
ωi
)
bi
}
.
where the discount price of total debt q′i is given in equation (1.18).
Similarly, the coupon rates can be written in terms of total debt and foreign share,
c′if =
1
1− τ
 1 + τ1−τ E
[
md(s, s
′) e
′
e 1
′
]
E
[
md(s, s′) e
′
e
{
1
1−τ 1
′ + ξ
e′
e
1−ω′i+ e
′
e ω
′
i
pi′i+f∗+f
b′i
(1− 1′)
}] − 1
 , (1.13)
c′id =
1
1− τ
 1 + τ1−τ E [md(s, s′)1′]
E
[
md(s, s′)
{
1
1−τ 1
′ + ξ 1
1−ω′i+ e
′
e ω
′
i
pi′i+f∗+f
b′i
(1− 1′)
}] − 1
 . (1.14)
The firm’s problem can now be stated in terms of the total debt and foreign share.
Problem 1.4.1 (Recursive Formulation of Firm i ’s Problem). Given the price schedules pi(xi, X),
c′if (b
′
i, ω
′
i, s), and c
′
id(b
′
i, ω
′
i, s), firm i solves the following program,
Vi(bi, ωi, s) = max
b′i,ω
′
i
di + E [md(s, s′) max (0, Vi(b′i, ω′i, s′))] , (1.15)
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subject to,
di =
(
1 + λ1{di<0}
){
(1− τ)pii(zi, e) + q′ib′i −
(
1− ωi + e
e−1
ωi
)
bi
}
, (1.16)
pii(zi, e) = max
xi,x∗i
pixi + ep
∗
i x
∗
i −
η1
η2
exp(zi)(xi + x
∗
i )
η2 − f∗ 1{x∗i>0} − f, (1.17)
where the discount price of total debt issued is,
q′i =
1− ω′i
1 + (1− τ)c′id
+
ω′i
1 + (1− τ)c′if
. (1.18)
1.4.6 Competitive Equilibrium
Now that the problems for the representative consumer, the international lenders, and firms have
been defined, the competitive equilibrium can be formally stated.
Definition 1.4.2 (Recursive Competitive Equilibrium). A recursive competitive equilibrium consists
of pricing functions pi(xi, X), c
′
id(b
′
i, ω
′
i, s), and c
′
if (b
′
i, ω
′
i, s), value functions Vi(bi, ωi, s), and optimal
decision rules gi,b′(bi, ωi, s), gi,ω′(bi, ωi, s), gi,x(s), and gi,x∗(s), such that:
1. Consumer’s Optimization: Price functions pi(xi, X) satisfy the following conditions:
pi(xi, X) = y x
ρ−1
i X
−ρ, i ∈ Ω,
where
X =
(∫
i∈Ω
xρi di
) 1
ρ
.
2. International Lenders: Coupon schedules c′id(b
′
i, ω
′
i, s), and c
′
if (b
′
i, ω
′
i, s) satisfy the following
Euler equations (1.13) and (1.14).
3. Firms’ Optimization: Value functions Vi(b, ω, s) solve the Bellman equation (1.15), subject
to constraints (1.16), (1.17), and (1.18). The associated optimal decision rules for firm i are
denoted by: b′i = gi,b′(b, ω, s), ω
′
i = gi,ω′(b, ω, s), xi = gi,x(s), and x
∗
i = gi,x∗(s).
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4. Aggregate Consistency: The aggregate good X(e) is consistent with the actual law of motion
implied by the optimal decision rules gi,x(s) and the transition matrix for s,
X(e) =
(∫
zi
gi,x(zi, e)
ρ dG(zi)
) 1
ρ
,
where G is the unconditional distribution of idiosyncratic shocks zi.
There are no closed-form expressions for this equilibrium. However numerical techniques can be
employed to solve it. The next section will present numerical solutions for this economy.
1.5 Numerical Results
First I present the calibration strategy for the exogenous shocks in the model: the exchange rate
process and the idiosyncratic shock process. Then I choose a reasonable set of model parameters
based on various studies in the corporate finance literature. Finally I present some simulation results
of the model.
1.5.1 Calibration
Exchange Rate Process
The real exchange rate series is constructed from the nominal exchange rate and the inflation data.
The details are shown in Appendix C. The statistical properties of the real exchange rate are sum-
marized in Panel A of Table 1.5. For simplicity, the real exchange rate process is assumed to follow
an AR(1) process in the logarithm,
log(et+1) = c+ ρe log(et) + σet. (1.19)
The estimated parameters are shown in the panel B of Table 1.5. The process (1.19) is transformed
into a discrete Markov chain using the Tauchen and Hussey (1991) procedure, using 11 points.
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Panel A: Statistics
µ(et) σ(et) ρ(et, et−1)
Estimates (1994-2009) 3.4158 0.7412 0.9017
Estimates (1999-2009) 3.0432 0.2305 0.7038
Panel B: AR(1) Estimates
c σe ρe
Estimates (1994-2009) 0.3359 0.3205 0.9017
Estimates (1999-2009) 0.9015 0.1638 0.7038
Table 1.5: Statistics and AR(1) Estimates of the Real Exchange Rate Process. Panel A
reports the statistics for the real exchange rate process. Panel B reports the parameter estimates
when the real exchange rate is assumed to follow an AR(1) process, given by log(et+1) = c +
ρe log(et) + σet. The results are shown for two different time periods. The data frequency is
quarterly.
Cost Parameters
The variables in the model are mapped to data according to Table 1.6. The various cost parameters:
η1, η2, f , and f
∗ and the preference parameters: y and p∗i are chosen such that the first moments
of the simulations match their data counterpart, given in Table 1.7. The deterministic steady state
of this economy is used for the purpose of this calibration exercise. The exchange rate and the cost
shocks are set to their steady state value, that is e¯ = z¯ = 0. The steady state production and sales
policies are solved as a function of the model parameters. These expressions are used to match 3
first moments of the data: (Domestic Sales/Assets), (Foreign Sales/Assets), and (Cost/Assets). The
details of the algebra can be found in Appendix D. The parameter values for the cost parameters
are reported in Table 1.8.
The cost process zi is parameterized along the lines of Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and Whited
(2005). I assume the cost process to be a random walk and have a high volatility σe = 0.3. These
numbers are standard in the literature for this type of exercise. The shock process is represented by
a discrete Markov chain using 11 points. The parameters are reported in Table 1.8.
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Data Model
Real Side:
Total Assets xi + x
∗
i
Total Sales pixi + ep
∗
i x
∗
i
Domestic Sales pixi
Foreign Sales ep∗i x
∗
i
Cost η1η2 exp(zi)(xi + x
∗
i )
η2 + f∗ + f
Profits pii = pixi + ep
∗
i x
∗
i − (η1η2 exp(zi)(xi + x∗i )η2 + f∗ + f)
Profit Margin pii/(pixi + ep
∗
i x
∗
i )
Market Share pixi/
∫
i
pixi dG(zi)
Financing Side:
Total Debt b′i
Domestic Debt (1− ω′i)b′i
Foreign Debt ω′ib
′
i
Corporate Spread (q′i)
−1 − β−1
Table 1.6: Mapping of Variables from the Model to Data.
Data Mean Std. Dev.
Total Sales/Assets 0.212 0.136
Domestic Sales/Assets 0.183 0.141
Foreign Sales/Assets 0.029 0.046
Cost/Assets 0.191 0.132
Profits/Assets 0.022 0.023
Profit Margin 0.105 0.388
Market Share 0.119 0.217
Table 1.7: Target Moments for Calibration.
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Institutional Parameters
Cost of equity issuances are chosen to be 15%. This figure seems reasonable as Hennessy and Whited
(2008) estimated these issuance costs to be about 6% using the simulated method of moments with
US data. It is certainly plausible to believe that equity markets in Mexico have more informational
asymmetry than in the US. The average tax rate is chosen to be 25%. Bankruptcy costs are assumed
to correspond to a dead-weight cost of 20% of current production, thus the recovery rate is set to
ξ = 0.8. Lastly the pricing kernel used to discount firms’ cashflows and price the debt is chosen to
be equal to the subjective discount rate β, which is chosen to correspond to a 3% yearly risk-free
interest rate. The set of parameters used to solve the model are summarized in Table 1.8.
β = 0.992 Risk free rate
Preference ρ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75} Substitutability of goods
y = 3.6 Consumer expenditure
p∗i = 0.145 Foreign prices
η1 = 0.006 Production cost parameter
η2 = 2 Production cost parameter
Technology f = 2.1 Fixed cost of operation
f∗ = 0.6 Fixed cost of exporting
λ = 0.15 Linear cost of issuing equity
Institution ξ = 0.8 Recovery rate in event of bankruptcy
τ = 0.25 Average corporate tax rate
e¯ = 1 Long-run mean for e
Exchange Rate ρe = 0.7 Autocorrelation for e
σe = 0.15 Volatility for e
z¯ = 1 Long-run mean of zi
Idiosyncratic Cost ρz = 0 Autocorrelation of zi
σz = 0.3 Volatility of zi
Table 1.8: Parameter Values.
1.5.2 Production and Sales Policy
Cost shocks are the only idiosyncratic shocks in these numerical examples. The foreign prices p∗i
are constant. Figure 1.5 shows profits pii(zi, e), sensitivity of profits dpii(zi, e)/de, domestic xi(zi, e)
and foreign x∗i (zi, e) sales as a function of the exchange rate e and idiosyncratic cost shock zi, for
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different values of the elasticity of substitution. These graphs will give some intuition about the
basic margins in the equilibrium sales decisions. Total production and exports are decreasing in the
cost. This result is fairly intuitive. As the firm becomes more productive, i.e. cost decreases, it can
produce more units. As more units are being sold, domestic prices decrease up to the point where the
foreign price becomes more attractive. Total production and exports are increasing in the exchange
rate. This result follows a similar intuition. As the exchange rate appreciates, foreign prices (in
peso) increase and thus exporting becomes more profitable. This will drive firms to produce more
and export more. As expected, profits follow the monotonicity properties of total production, i.e.
decreasing in the cost and increasing in the exchange rate. Because profits are convex in both
arguments, it follows that the sensitivity of profits to e is also decreasing in the cost and increasing
in the exchange rate. Thus the most productive firms have the highest sensitivity of profits to the
exchange rate. This property will be crucial for the optimal capital structure.
Pass-through and exposure are two statistics central to the financing decisions of firms. Figure 1.6
shows the pass-through η(zi, e) and exposure δ(zi, e) as a function of exchange rate e and cost shock
zi. Both pass-through and exposure are decreasing in the cost and increasing in the exchange rate.
However the interesting feature is that firms can have no exports but strictly positive exposure.
An increase in the elasticity of substitution leads to an increase in both pass-through and exposure
for less productive firms, but a decrease in the pass-through for the more productive firms. This
result confirms the basic intuition from the stylized model. A higher elasticity of substitution will
link firms more strongly and thus firms with no foreign sales will be exposed to the exchange rate
fluctuations.
1.5.3 Financing Policy
The cost and preference parameters have been selected so as to match data moments on the real
side. The institution parameters have been chosen following previous work in the corporate finance
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Figure 1.5: Profits, Sensitivity of Profits, and Sales Policies. The left figures plot profits pii
and the sensitivity of profits to the exchange rate dpii/de as a function of the exchange rate e and
cost shock zi. The right figures plot the optimal sales policies: percentage of exports x
∗
i /(xi + x
∗
i )
and total production (xi + x
∗
i ) as a function of the exchange rate e and cost shock zi. Each row
corresponds to a different values of the elasticity of substitution, ρ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
Figure 1.6: Pass-through and Exposure. The figure shows the pass-through η (top row) and
exposure δ (bottom row) as a function of the exchange rate e and cost shock zi. Each column
corresponds to a different values of the elasticity of substitution, ρ ∈ {0.25, 0.5, 0.75}.
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literature. The parameters of the idiosyncratic cost process have been chosen such that the trade-off
between tax benefits and expected cost of default implies an average leverage in the simulations that
matches the mean in the data for (Debt/Assets). The model has not been calibrated to match the
quantity of dollar debt observed in the data. Therefore the share of dollar debt that comes out of
the model can be thought as an over-identifying restriction for the model.
The economy is simulated for a panel of 100 firms over 200 periods. The first 100 periods in
the simulated sample is dropped in order to mitigate the effect of the initial conditions. Summary
statistics of the firms’ optimal policies along with the data counterpart are given in Table 1.9. As
can be seen, most of the calibrated moments are reasonably close the data moments. The share of
the foreign debt in the model is close to 40%, whereas it is about 37% in the data. This quantitative
exercise shows that the model can in fact rationalize the aggregate quantities for firms, both on the
real side and the financing side.
Firms All Local
Variable Data Model Data Model
ρ = 0.5 ρ = 0.5
Real Side:
Total Sales/Assets µ 21.2% 22.4% µ 22.8% 17.3%
σ 13.6% σ 16.9%
Domestic Sales/Assets µ 18.3% 19% µ 22.8% 17.3%
σ 14.1% σ 16.9%
Foreign Sales/Assets µ 3% 3.4% µ 0% 0%
σ 4.6% σ 0%
Profits/Assets µ 2.2% 1.8% µ 2.2% 0.9%
σ 2.3% σ 2.3%
Profit Margin µ 10.5% 8% µ 9.8% 3.9%
σ 38.8% σ 62.1%
Financing Side:
Debt/Assets µ 38.3% 55.5% µ 29.9% 64%
σ 20% σ 17.9%
Foreign Debt/Assets µ 16.3% 24.8% µ 4.6% 26.3%
σ 18.1% σ 7.8%
Share of Foreign Debt µ 36.7% 44.3% µ 14.9% 37.4%
σ 31.9% σ 20.3%
Table 1.9: Summary Statistics of Monte carlo Simulations. The economy is simulated for a
panel of 100 firms over 200 periods (first 100 periods in the sample are dropped).
36
1.6 Conclusion
In this paper I propose a model of production and financing decisions for firms in an open economy.
I show that exchange rate fluctuations can potentially affect not only the profits of firms in the
tradable sector, but also the profits of firms in the non-tradable sector as well. This effect is due
to the imperfect competition in the domestic goods market. In addition, I also derive the model
implications for the optimal denomination of corporate debt. This framework reconciles the puzzling
fact that firms in emerging markets with no exports take on large shares of their debt in dollars.
First I develop a stylized model that highlights a channel by which the export decision of the
exporting firm impacts the prices of all domestic goods. An implication of this channel is that
local firms can potentially have a high exchange rate exposure. The motive to hedge these high
currency exposures leads firms to use large amounts of dollar debt. Although it may seem that firms
are taking on excessive dollar debt, they are in fact hedging the exchange rate sensitivity of their
profits. The model predicts that the level of exchange rate fluctuations that is passed on to the local
firm is increasing in the substitutability of the goods in the economy, and decreasing in the market
share of the local firm.
Using a panel of traded Mexican firms for the last ten years, I show that the sales of local
firms are sensitive to the exchange rate, but that their earnings, defined as sales minus costs minus
financing expenses, are not. This is evidence that local firms are effectively using financing to hedge
the sensitivity of their sales. I also find support for the comparative statics of the model. Local
firms (i) in more concentrated goods markets and (ii) with smaller market shares hold higher shares
of dollar debt.
In the last section I develop a quantitative model that is used to study the effect of the goods
market imperfection on the amount of foreign debt issued by local firms. The stylized model is
augmented to include a continuum of firms -different cost shocks- and imperfect financial markets,
and is made fully dynamic. Firms can issue defaultable debt and costly equity. Optimal leverage
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is a result of the tradeoff between tax shield and expected distress costs, and the optimal share of
foreign debt arises from the motive to hedge profits. The model parameters are chosen to match
moments of the data. The calibrated model accounts for the average amount of dollar debt observed
in the Mexican firms data.
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1.7 Appendix
Appendix A – Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1.2.1:
Using the fact that both firms produce at capacity, the optimization problem for the exporting firm
is simply,
pi1(e) = max
x1
p1(x1, x¯2)x1 + ep
∗
1(x¯1 − x1).
The first order condition is,
∂pi1
∂x1
= p1(x1, x¯2)
(
1 +
x1
p1
∂p1
∂x1
(x1, x¯2)
)
− ep∗1 = 0.
Recall from matrix (1.6) that the own elasticity for good 1 is p1,1 = ρ(1−λ)− 1, thus the first order
condition is,
ρ(1− λ(x1, x¯2))p1(x1, x¯2)− ep∗1 = 0.
The equilibrium condition can be restated as f(x1, e) = 0 where the function f is defined as,
f(x1, e) = ρ(1− λ(x1, x¯2))p1(x1, x¯2)− ep∗1.
Let x˜1(e) be the solution of f(x1, e) = 0. The following formulae will be useful for the proof,
log(1− λ(x1, x¯2)) = log(1− α) + ρ log x¯2 − log(αxρ1 + (1− α)x¯ρ2),
log(p1(x1, x¯2)) = logα+ (ρ− 1) log x1 + log y − log(αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2).
Note that,
∂ log(αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2)
∂ log e
=
∂ log x1
∂ log e αρx
ρ
1
αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2
= ρλ
∂ log x1
∂ log e
.
Using the definition of f yields the following condition,
ρ(1− λ(x˜1, x¯2))p1(x˜1, x¯2) = ep∗1.
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Taking the logarithm on both sides yields,
log
(
ρ(1− α)αx¯ρ2y
p∗1
)
+ (ρ− 1) log x˜1 − 2 log(αx˜ρ1 + (1− α)x¯ρ2) = log e.
Differentiating both sides with respect to log(e) yields,
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e
(ρ− 1− 2ρλ) = 1.
This implies that x˜1 is decreasing in e, as λ ∈ (0, 1) and ρ ∈ [0, 1],
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e
= − 1
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 1.2.2:
Neither firms incur costs of production, so firms produce at capacity. This result yields the optimal
sales policy for firm 2,
x2 = x¯2.
As shown in Lemma 1, x˜1 is the level of domestic sales that equates the marginal benefits between
the domestic and foreign markets. Thus if the exporting firm has not reached capacity, the optimal
policy will be to sell x˜1 in the domestic market and sell the rest of the production in the foreign
market. Formally,
x1(e) = x˜1(e),
x∗1(e) = x¯1 − x˜1(e).
On the other hand, if x˜1 is greater than the production capacity x¯1, the exporting firm will sell all
of its production in the domestic market, as the marginal benefit of selling in the domestic market
is higher than in the foreign market, i.e.,
x1(e) = x¯1,
x∗1(e) = 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2.3:
Prices in the domestic market are obtained directly by plugging the optimal policies x1(e) and x2
from Lemma 1.2.1 into equations (1.3) and (1.4),
p1(e) =
{ αx˜1(e)(ρ−1) y
αx˜1(e)ρ+(1−α)x¯ρ2 if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
αx¯
(ρ−1)
1 y
αx¯ρ1+(1−α)x¯ρ2 if x˜1 > x¯1,
p2(e) =
{
(1−α)x¯(ρ−1)2 y
αx˜1(e)ρ+(1−α)x¯ρ2 , if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
(1−α)x¯(ρ−1)2 y
αx¯ρ1+(1−α)x¯ρ2 , if x˜1 > x¯1.
The logarithm of prices, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, are,
log p1(e) = logα+ (ρ− 1) log x˜1(e) + log y − log(αx˜1(e)ρ + (1− α)x¯ρ2),
log p2(e) = log(1− α) + (ρ− 1) log x¯2 + log y − log(αx˜1(e)ρ + (1− α)x¯ρ2),
and are constants if x˜1 > x¯1.
Recall from the proof of Lemma 1 that,
∂ log(αxρ1 + (1− α)xρ2)
∂ log e
= ρλ
∂ log x1
∂ log e
.
The elasticity of prices, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, are given by,
∂ log p1
∂ log e
(e) = −(1− ρ(1− λ)) ∂ log x1
∂ log e
,
∂ log p2
∂ log e
(e) = −ρλ ∂ log x1
∂ log e
.
Using the expression for the elasticity of x˜1(e) from Lemma 1, pass-throughs for both firms are given
by,
η1(e) ≡ ∂ log p1
∂ log e
(e) =
1− ρ(1− λ)
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) ,
η2(e) ≡ ∂ log p1
∂ log e
(e) =
ρλ
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) .
Alternatively, η1 = η and η2 = (1 − η), with η ≡ 1−ρ(1−λ)1+ρ(2λ−1) . For the case where x˜1 > x¯1, the
logarithm of prices are constants and thus elasticities are zero.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2.4:
The logarithm of pass-throughs for both firms are given by,
log η1(e) = log(1− ρ(1− λ))− log(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)),
log η2(e) = log(ρ) + log(λ)− log(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)).
Note that,
∂ log(1− ρ(1− λ))
∂ log λ
=
ρλ
1− ρ(1− λ) ,
∂ log(1− ρ(1− λ))
∂ log ρ
=
−ρ(1− λ)
1− ρ(1− λ) ,
and that,
∂ log(1 + ρ(2λ− 1))
∂ log λ
=
2ρλ
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) ,
∂ log(1 + ρ(2λ− 1))
∂ log ρ
=
ρ(2λ− 1)
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) .
The comparative statics for the pass-through of the local firm are given by,
∂ log η1
∂ log λ
(e) =
−ρλ(1− ρ)
(1− ρ(1− λ))(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)) ≤ 0,
∂ log η1
∂ log ρ
(e) =
−ρλ
(1− ρ(1− λ))(1 + ρ(2λ− 1)) ≤ 0.
The comparative statics for the pass-through of the exporting firm are given by,
∂ log η2
∂ log λ
(e) =
1− ρ
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) ≥ 0,
∂ log η2
∂ log ρ
(e) =
1
1 + ρ(2λ− 1) ≥ 0.
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Proof of Proposition 1.2.5:
Profits are obtained directly by plugging the optimal policies x1(e) and x2 from Lemma 1.2.1 and
prices from Proposition 1.2.3 into the definition of profits,
pi1(e) =
{
p1x˜1 + ep
∗
1(x¯1 − x˜1), if x˜1 ≤ x¯1,
p1x¯1, if x˜1 > x¯1,
pi2(e) = p2x¯2,
The logarithm of profits for the exporting firm, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, is given by,
log pi1(e) = log
(
p1x˜1 + ep
∗
1(x¯1 − x˜1)
)
.
The elasticity of profits for the exporting firm, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, is given by,
∂ log pi1
∂ log e
(e) =
p1x˜1
(
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e +
∂ log p1
∂ log e
)
− ep∗1x˜1 ∂ log x˜1∂ log e + ep∗1(x¯1 − x˜1)
p1x˜1 + ep∗1(x¯1 − x˜1)
.
Using the fact that ∂ log p1∂ log e =
∂ log p1
∂ log x˜1
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e and the equilibrium condition f(x˜1(e), e) = 0 yields,{
p1
(
1 +
∂ log p1
∂ log x˜1
)
− ep∗1
}
x˜1
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e
=
{
p1
(
1 +
∂x˜1
∂p1
∂p1
∂x˜1
)
− ep∗1
}
x˜1
∂ log x˜1
∂ log e
= 0.
Therefore the elasticity of profits for the exporting firm, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, is,
∂ log pi1
∂ log e
(e) =
ep∗1(x¯1 − x˜1)
p1x˜1 + ep∗1(x¯1 − x˜1)
.
The logarithm of profits for the local firm is simply,
log pi2(e) = log p2 + log x¯2.
Therefore the elasticity of profits for the local firm, for x˜1 ≤ x¯1, is,
∂ log pi2
∂ log e
(e) =
∂ log p2
∂ log e
(e) = η2(e) = 1− η.
If x˜1 > x¯1, profits for both firms are constant and therefore exposures are zero.
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Exchange rate exposure for both firm are given by,
δ1(e) = χ 1{x˜1≤x¯1},
δ2(e) = (1− η) 1{x˜1≤x¯1}.
where χ ≡ ep∗1(x¯1−x˜1)p1x˜1+ep∗1(x¯1−x˜1) .
Proof of Proposition 1.2.6:
The first order conditions are given by,
u′(β(bd + e¯bf )) = E [u′ (pi(e1)− bd − e1bf )] ,
e¯u′(β(bd + e¯bf )) = E [e1u′ (pi(e1)− bd − e1bf )] .
Assume that the volatility of the exchange rate is small, i.e. σe << 1. Given the exchange rate
dynamics, a Taylor series for the profit function can be exploited,
pi(e1) = pi(e¯) + (e1 − e¯)∂pi
∂e
(e¯) +O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)
.
Therefore,
pi(e1)− bd − e1bf = {pi(e¯)− bd − e¯bf}+ (e1 − e¯)
{
∂pi
∂e
(e¯)− bf
}
+O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)
.
A Taylor series for the marginal utility function is,
u′(pi(e1)− bd − e1bf ) = u′(p¯i) + (e1 − e¯)
(
∂pi(e¯)
∂e
− bf
)
u′′(p¯i) +O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)
.
where p¯i ≡ pi(e¯)− bd − e¯bf is a constant. The utility is strictly concave, i.e. u′′ < 0. Combining the
first order conditions yields the following equilibrium condition,
0 = E [(e1 − e¯)u′ (pi(e1)− bd − e1bf )] .
Using the Taylor series approximation simplifies the previous expression to,
0 = E
[
(e1 − e¯)2
](∂pi
∂e
(e¯)− bf
)
.
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The equilibrium condition yields the following rule for the optimal dollar debt,
bf =
∂pi
∂e
(e¯).
The Taylor series for the marginal utility function becomes,
u′(pi(e1)− bd − e1bf ) = u′(p¯i) +O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)
.
Plugging the previous approximation into the first order condition for bd yields,
u′(β(bd + e¯bf )) = E
[
u′(p¯i) +O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)]
= u′(p¯i) + E
[
O
(
(e1 − e¯)2
)] ≈ u′(p¯i).
Taking the inverse marginal utility function on both sides yields,
β(bd + e¯bf ) = p¯i = pi(e¯)− bd − e¯bf .
Rearranging the previous expression yields the desired result,
bd =
pi(e¯)
1 + β
− e¯ ∂pi
∂e
(e¯).
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Proof of Proposition 1.2.7:
The share of foreign debt is given by,
ω ≡ e¯bf
(bd + e¯bf
=
e¯∂pi∂e (e¯)
pi(e¯)
1+β
= (1 + β)
e¯
pi(e¯)
∂pi
∂e
(e¯) = (1 + β)
∂ log pi
∂ log e
(e¯) = (1 + β)δ.
The share of foreign debt for the exporting firm is thus,
ω1 = (1 + β) χ(e¯) 1{x˜1(e¯)≤x¯1}.
The share of foreign debt for the local firm is thus,
ω2 = (1 + β) (1− η(e¯)) 1{x˜1(e¯)≤x¯1}.
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Appendix B – Mexican Firms Listed on the Mexican Stock Market
Panel A: Materials
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
AHMSA ALTOS HORNOS DE MEXICO, S.A. DE C.V.
AUTLAN COMPAIA MINERA AUTLAN, S.A.B. DE C. V.
CEMEX CEMEX, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CMOCTEZ CORPORACION MOCTEZUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CODUSA CORPORACION DURANGO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
COLLADO G COLLADO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CONVER CONVERTIDORA INDUSTRIAL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CYDSASA CYDSA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
FRES FRESNILLO PLC
GCC GRUPO CEMENTOS DE CHIHUAHUA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMEXICO GRUPO MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ICH INDUSTRIAS CH, S.A.B. DE C.V.
MEXCHEM MEXICHEM, S.A.B. DE C.V.
PENOLES INDUSTRIAS PEOLES, S.A.B. DE C. V.
POCHTEC GRUPO POCHTECA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
QBINDUS Q.B. INDUSTRIAS, S.A. DE C.V.
SIMEC GRUPO SIMEC, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TEKCHEM TEKCHEM, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TS TENARIS S.A.
VITRO VITRO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
Panel B: Manufacturing
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
ACCELSA ACCEL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ALFA ALFA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ARA CONSORCIO ARA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ASUR GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL SURESTE, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CERAMIC INTERNACIONAL DE CERAMICA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CICSA CARSO INFRAESTRUCTURA Y CONSTRUCCIN, S.A.B. DE C.V.
DINE DINE, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GAP GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL PACIFICO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GCARSO GRUPO CARSO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GEO CORPORACION GEO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GISSA GRUPO INDUSTRIAL SALTILLO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMD GRUPO MEXICANO DE DESARROLLO, S.A.B.
GMDR GMD RESORTS, S.A.B.
HOGAR CONSORCIO HOGAR, S.A.B. DE C.V.
HOMEX DESARROLLADORA HOMEX, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ICA EMPRESAS ICA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
IDEAL IMPULSORA DEL DESARROLLO Y EL EMPLEO
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Panel B: Manufacturing (continued)
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
KUO GRUPO KUO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
LAMOSA GRUPO LAMOSA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
OMA GRUPO AEROPORTUARIO DEL CENTRO NORTE
PASA PROMOTORA AMBIENTAL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
PINFRA PROMOTORA Y OPERADORA DE INFRAESTRUCTURA
PYP GRUPO PROFESIONAL PLANEACION Y PROYECTOS
SARE SARE HOLDING, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TMM GRUPO TMM, S.A.
URBI URBI DESARROLLOS URBANOS, S.A.B. DE C.V.
Panel C: Consumer Goods & Services
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
ALSEA ALSEA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ARISTOS CONSORCIO ARISTOS, S.A. DE C.V.
CIDMEGA GRUPE, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CIE CORPORACION INTERAMERICANA DE ENTRETENIMIENTO
CMR CMR, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CNCI UNIVERSIDAD CNCI, S.A. DE C.V.
EDOARDO EDOARDOS MARTIN, S.A.B. DE C.V.
ELEKTRA GRUPO ELEKTRA, S.A. DE C.V.
GFAMSA GRUPO FAMSA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMARTI GRUPO MARTI, S.A.B.
GOMO GRUPO COMERCIAL GOMO, S.A. DE C.V.
GPH GRUPO PALACIO DE HIERRO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
HILASAL HILASAL MEXICANA S.A.B. DE C.V.
IASASA INDUSTRIA AUTOMOTRIZ, S.A. DE C.V.
LIVEPOL EL PUERTO DE LIVERPOOL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
POSADAS GRUPO POSADAS, S.A.B. DE C.V.
REALTUR REAL TURISMO S.A. DE C.V.
SANLUIS SANLUIS CORPORACION, S. A. DE C. V.
VASCONI GRUPO VASCONIA S.A.B.
Panel D: Consumer Durables
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
AGRIEXP AGRO INDUSTRIAL EXPORTADORA, S.A. DE C.V.
ARCA EMBOTELLADORAS ARCA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
BACHOCO INDUSTRIAS BACHOCO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
BAFAR GRUPO BAFAR, S.A. DE C.V.
BIMBO GRUPO BIMBO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
COMERCI CONTROLADORA COMERCIAL MEXICANA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CONTAL GRUPO CONTINENTAL, S.A.B.
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Panel D: Consumer Durables (continued)
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
FEMSA FOMENTO ECONMICO MEXICANO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GAM GRUPO AZUCARERO MXICO, S.A. DE C.V.
GEUPEC GRUPO EMBOTELLADORAS UNIDAS, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GIGANTE GRUPO GIGANTE, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMACMA GRUPO MAC MA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMODELO GRUPO MODELO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GMODERN GRUPO LA MODERNA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
GRUMA GRUMA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
HERDEZ GRUPO HERDEZ, S.A.B. DE C.V.
KIMBER KIMBERLY–CLARK DE MEXICO S.A.B. DE C.V.
KOF COCA-COLA FEMSA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
MASECA GRUPO INDUSTRIAL MASECA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
MINSA GRUPO MINSA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
NUTRISA GRUPO NUTRISA, S. A. DE C. V.
SAVIA SAVIA, S.A. DE C.V.
SORIANA ORGANIZACION SORIANA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
WALMEX WAL–MART DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
Panel E: Health Care
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
BEVIDES FARMACIAS BENAVIDES, S.A.B. DE C.V.
FRAGUA CORPORATIVO FRAGUA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
LAB GENOMMA LAB INTERNACIONAL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
MEDICA MEDICA SUR, S.A.B. DE C.V.
SAB GRUPO CASA SABA, S.A.B. DE C.V.
Panel F: Telecommunication Services
Ticker Symbol Company’s Name
AMX AMERICA MOVIL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
AXTEL AXTEL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
CABLE EMPRESAS CABLEVISION, S.A. DE C.V.
CEL GRUPO IUSACELL, S. A. DE C. V.
MAXCOM MAXCOM TELECOMUNICACIONES, S.A.B. DE C.V.
MEGA MEGACABLE HOLDINGS, S.A.B. DE C.V.
QUMMA GRUPO QUMMA, S.A. DE C.V.
RCENTRO GRUPO RADIO CENTRO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TELECOM CARSO GLOBAL TELECOM, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TELINT TELMEX INTERNACIONAL, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TELMEX TELEFONOS DE MEXICO, S.A.B. DE C.V.
TLEVISA GRUPO TELEVISA, S.A.
TVAZTCA TV AZTECA, S.A. DE C.V.
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Appendix C – Real Exchange Rate
The nominal and real exchange rates are denoted by e˜ and e, respectively. Let R˜e and Re be the
gross rate of return on the nominal and real exchange rates, respectively. Denote the inflation in
country i by pii, for i = {MEX,USA}. The following no–arbitrage condition must hold,
R˜e = Re
(
1 + piUSA
1 + piMEX
)
.
The real exchange rate series {et} can be computed using data on nominal exchange rate {e˜t} and
inflation {piMEXt , piUSAt } as follows,
et+1
et
=
e˜t+1
e˜t
1 + piUSAt+1
1 + piMEXt+1
.
Taking the log on both sides yields,
∆ log(et+1) = ∆ log(e˜t+1) + log(1 + pi
USA
t+1 )− log(1 + piMEXt+1 ).
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Appendix D – Calibration of the Cost Parameters
The economy is set at its deterministic steady state, that is e = e¯ and zi = z¯ for all firms. Assume
that there are N firms in this economy. Because all firms have the same level of productivity and
have the same cost structure, they will choose the same policies, i.e. xi = x and x
∗
i = x
∗. That also
means that the domestic market share for all firms is identical λi = λ, and all prices are equal pi = p.
The first order conditions for problem 1.17 are given by,
∂pii
∂xi
= ρ(1− λi)pi − η1(xi + x∗i )η2−1 = 0
∂pii
∂x∗i
= e¯p∗i − η1(xi + x∗i )η2−1 = 0
Recall that the price for good i is pi(xi, X) = y x
ρ−1
i X
−ρ, where
X =
(∫
i
xρi di
) 1
ρ
=
(
xρi
∫
i
di
) 1
ρ
= xi.
Thus the price can be rewritten as follows,
pi = y x
ρ−1
i X
−ρ = y x−1i .
Subtracting FOC(xi) from FOC(x
∗
i ) leads to,
pi =
e¯p∗i
ρ(1− λi) .
Using the two previous formulae for the price yields the domestic sales,
xi =
ρy(1− λi)
e¯p∗i
. (1.20)
FOC(x∗i ) yields the total production,
xi + x
∗
i =
(
e¯p∗i
η1
) 1
η2−1
. (1.21)
Foreign sales are thus,
x∗i =
(
e¯p∗i
η1
) 1
η2−1 − ρy(1− λi)
e¯p∗i
. (1.22)
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Production costs are,
Cost ≡ η1
η2
(xi + x
∗
i )
η2 + f∗ + f =
η1
η2
(
e¯p∗i
η1
) η2
η2−1
+ f∗ + f. (1.23)
The ratio of domestic sales to total production is,
pixi
xi + x∗i
= y
(
e¯p∗i
η1
)− 1η2−1
. (1.24)
The ratio of foreign sales to total production is,
e¯p∗i x
∗
i
xi + x∗i
= e¯p∗i
{(
e¯p∗i
η1
) 1
η2−1 − ρy(1− λi)
e¯p∗i
}(
e¯p∗i
η1
)− 1η2−1
. (1.25)
The ratio of costs to total production is,
η1
η2
(xi + x
∗
i )
η2 + f∗ + f
xi + x∗i
=
e¯p∗i
η2
+ (f∗ + f)
(
e¯p∗i
η1
)− 1η2−1
. (1.26)
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Chapter 2
Stochastic Volatility, Credit
Spreads, and the Q Theory of
Investment
joint with Franc¸ois Gourio
2.1 Introduction
According to the neoclassical theory of investment (Abel (1979), Hayashi (1982)), Tobin’s Q, the
ratio of the firm value to its capital stock, is a sufficient statistic for the firm’s optimal invest-
ment. However, this model is empirically rejected: Tobin’s Q is weakly correlated with investment;
moreover, cash flow enters significantly and reduces further the economic significance of Q.
Recent empirical work shows that bond yields, on the other hand, are strongly correlated with
investment, both in the cross-section (Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2008)), and in the time series (Philip-
pon (2009)). This result is surprising, because in a standard investment model, there is no reason
why one of the two asset prices - stocks or bonds - should correlate more with Q: a positive shock to
profitability increases both the stock price and the bond price, i.e. decrease the yield or spread, as
well as increase investment. That is true even if the firm never uses the equity market for financing
– the equity value, which is the expected present discounted value of dividends, still reflects the
higher profitability, a point emphasized by Gomes (2001).
In this paper, we propose a model of financing and investment for firms that attempts to explain
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both the weak correlation of Tobin’s Q with investment, and the higher correlation of bond yields
with investment. Following Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005) and Gomes and Schmid
(2010), our model augments the standard neoclassical model with financing frictions. Specifically,
we assume that firms fund their investment by issuing equity or defaultable debt. The firm-specific
probability of default leads to a firm-specific interest rate, which exactly compensates investors for
the risk of default. An increase in profitability leads, in this model, to an increase in investment, as
well as a rise in the stock price and in the bond price (i.e. a reduction in the firm-specific interest
rate or yield). As is well known, this model thus generates a positive correlation between investment
and Q, and between investment and bond yield. The correlation between Q and investment is high,
contrary to the data.
Our contribution is to introduce an additional source of shocks in the model, namely shocks
to firm-level volatility. When volatility goes up, the option value of default goes up, leading the
equity value to go up while the bond value goes down. At the same time, investment falls because
of the higher cost of financing (and possibly because of the higher uncertainty in itself1). Hence,
investment is correlated with bond prices but not with stock prices.
While a large empirical literature documents that stock returns are heteroskedastic, there is
relatively little structural modeling which incorporates this mechanism. We find the stochastic
volatility appealing, since firms evolve over time and may become more risky, e.g. because they
introduce face new competitors due to a technological innovation. Other real-world examples include
the introduction of a new product, or the entry of a new market.2
The unconditional correlation, in our model, is a weighted average of the correlation conditional
on profitability shocks, and the correlation conditional on volatility shocks. Both shocks lead to a
1This is the effect emphasized by the real options literature, e.g. Pindyck (1989), Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen
(2007), and others.
2Some of these examples may reflect an endogenous choice by the firm, rather than an exogenous shock to volatility.
However many of these choices are likely determined by other considerations than a choice of volatility, weakening
the endogeneity problem. Still, it would be interesting to consider a model where firms decide on their volatility.
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positive correlation of bond prices and investment, hence the model predicts that this correlation
is high. But only the profitability shock generates a positive correlation between stock prices and
investment, hence the correlation of stock prices and investment is low. Hence, our model can
replicate the patterns of correlations in the data.
An interesting empirical implication of the model regards the correlation between a firm’s bond
return and its stock return. In the standard model (i.e. with constant volatility), bond returns and
stock returns are highly correlated. In our model, volatility shocks induce a negative correlation. We
plan to use this as a test of our model. Preliminary results suggests that this correlation is indeed
negative for firms close to default.
Organization of the Paper
The rest of the introduction reviews the related literature. Section 2.2 studies a simple two period
example which helps clarify the intuition. Section 2.3 presents our quantitative model. Section 2.4
calibrates it and studies its implications numerically. Section 2.5 concludes.
Literature Review
Our paper is directly related to the vast literature on the Q-theory of investment and the cash flow
sensitivity (e.g. Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen (1988), Gilchrist and Himmelberg (1995), Gomes
(2001)). This literature documents the empirical significance of cash flows and its interpretation.
One conclusion from this literature is that, while there are many potential mechanisms that break the
theoretical link between Q and investment, such as fixed costs, financing constraints, or decreasing
return to scales, there are very few quantitative models which replicate the failure of the investment
regressions, and most researchers appeal to measurement error in Q (e.g., Erickson and Whited
(2001), Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2008)).
Second, there is a small literature on the relation between investment and uncertainty. This
literature emphasizes that models with real options or equivalently fixed cost or irreversibility imply
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a negative effect of uncertainty on investment (see e.g. Bernanke (1983), Dixit and Pindyck (1994),
Caballero (1991), Pindyck (1993), Bloom, Bond and Van Reenen (2007)). In our model, the effect
of uncertainty occurs through a different mechanism: debt becomes a less efficient means of finance
when uncertainty increases. Empirical evidence suggests a significant effect of uncertainty on in-
vestment (Leahy and Whited (1996), Guioso and Parigi (1999)) but the channel through which the
effect operates is not established.
Recently several studies have considered the possibility that idiosyncratic risk varies over time
(Bloom (2009), Bachmann and Bayer (2009)), however our point of departure is somewhat different
since we consider idiosyncratic increases in firm volatility, i.e. volatility shocks are not correlated
across firms.
The corporate finance literature has emphasized the endogeneity of volatility, known as the
risk-shifting problem (equity holders may choose to increase volatility). Our model has exogenous
increases in the volatility of the technology shocks, but firms respond to these changes by altering
capital, hence the total volatility of profits is endogenous. But because debt is one-period, the
volatility is known by debtholders when they decide to buy the firm’s bonds. Hence there is no
risk-shifting problem in this setup.
2.2 Two-Period Partial Equilibrium Example
This section provides a simple model to illustrate the effect of an increase in risk on investment,
equity value, Tobin Q and bond yields. There are two time periods. At time 1, the firm buys capital
k, which is financed using equity issuance s and debt: the firm issues a debt with face value b, with
market price price q(k, b). The budget constraint is,
χq(k, b)b+ s = k. (2.1)
The parameter χ > 1 reflects the tax shield effect (i.e. interest expenses are deductible from
corporate income). To simplify we assume in this section that the deduction is done at issuance: for
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each dollar of debt issued, the firm receives a subsidy (χ− 1)$.
At time 2, the firm produces, and generates a profit pi = zkα, where z is an idiosyncratic
shock, which is distributed according to a cumulative distribution function H. We denote by h the
corresponding probability distribution function.
The firm will default if its profits are not large enough to repay its debt, i.e. if z < z∗, where the
threshold z∗ is defined through the condition,
z∗kα = b. (2.2)
If the firm does default, the absolute priority rule applies: equity holders receive nothing, while
bondholders share the firm profits, net of proportional bankruptcy costs. We denote by θ the
recovery rate, i.e. 1− θ is bankruptcy costs.
The market price of debt is the expected discounted payoff to debtholders. Assuming that
investors are risk-neutral and have a discount factor β, we have,
q(k, b) = β
(∫ ∞
z∗
dH(z) +
∫ z∗
0
θ
zkα
b
dH(z)
)
. (2.3)
In this formula, the first term is the repayment of the face value in the non-default states, and the
second term is the recovery of profits, divided across all the bondholders in the event of default.
The firm equity value is the expected discounted payoff to equity holders, i.e. the expected profits
net of debt repayment, in non-default states:
V = β
∫ ∞
z∗
(zkα − b) dH(z). (2.4)
The firm picks k, b, s, and z∗ to maximize its present discounted value, V −s, subject to equations
(2.1), (2.2) and (2.3).3 This problem can be written as,
max
k,b,z∗
{
β
∫ ∞
z∗
(zkα − b) dH(z)− k + χq(k, b)b
}
,
3We assume in this example that there are no equity issuance costs.
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subject to,
q(k, b) = β
(∫ ∞
z∗
dH(z) +
∫ z∗
0
θ
zkα
b
dH(z)
)
,
z∗kα = b.
We can rewrite this by substituting out b:
max
k,z∗
{
β
∫ ∞
z∗
kα (z − z∗) dH(z)− k + χβ
(
z∗kα
∫ ∞
z∗
dH(z) +
∫ z∗
0
θzkαdH(z)
)}
,
or
max
k,z∗
{
βkαE(z) + β (χ− 1) z∗kα
∫ ∞
z∗
dH(z) + β (θχ− 1) kα
∫ z∗
0
zdH(z)− k
}
. (2.5)
The first term in this expression is the expected discounted operating profit, i.e. βkαE(z). The
second term reflects the expected tax shield benefits in non-default states, since z∗kα = b is the debt
issued. The third term reflects the expected bankruptcy costs, net of tax shield benefits, in default
states. The last term is the cost of investment.
It is easy to check that if there are no bankruptcy costs, θ = 1, then it is optimal to finance
with debt only. Inversely, if there is no tax shield, χ = 1, then an all-equity financing is optimal.
We assume that χθ < 1, i.e. bankruptcy costs are larger than the tax shield effect conditional on
default. This assumption is necessary to generate the standard trade-off.
The program (2.5) can be solved by writing the two first order conditions, with respect to k
and z∗, which determine the optimal investment and financing (intuitively, we can think of z∗ as
leverage, since it is the ratio of debt to expected output, z∗ = b/kα). First, we have,
1 = βαkα−1
{
E(z) + (χ− 1) z∗ (1−H(z∗)) + (θχ− 1)
∫ z∗
0
zdH(z)
}
. (2.6)
In the case with χ = θ = 1, we obtain the usual user cost rule: the expected marginal product of
capital is equal to the cost of capital, 1 = βαkα−1E(z). When θ < 1 or χ > 1, the user cost needs
to be adjusted to reflect expected bankruptcy costs (which increase the user cost) and the tax shield
(which decreases it).
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The second first-order condition, with respect to z∗, yields, after rearrangement,
((1−H(z∗)) (χ− 1) = χ (1− θ) z∗h (z∗) . (2.7)
This equation determines the optimal probability of default H(z∗), and the leverage z∗ = b/kα.
The left side is the marginal benefit of leverage, which is the higher tax shield in non-default states,
while the right side is the marginal cost of leverage, i.e. the increase in expected bankruptcy costs,
which depends on the probability of having z close to z∗. Under some regularity conditions on the
distribution h, equation (2.7) determines a unique default cutoff z∗, given the parameters χ and θ
and the distribution h.4 Equation (2.6) then determines the investment choice k.
We define Q as the total market value of the firm, divided by its capital stock:
Q =
market value(equity) + market value(debt)
k
,
=
V + χq(k, b)b
k
.
Note that we include the subsidy received, i.e. we count the total debt finance raised by the firm in
period 1.5
To understand the model, Figure 2.1 illustrates the optimal choice of debt. More precisely, we
present some firm outcomes, if the firm borrows an amount b, and makes the optimal investment
k∗. The optimal level of debt b∗ is denoted with a vertical line. Before picking b∗, however, the firm
contemplates financing with a different amount b 6= b∗, and this figure illustrates the consequences
of choosing a different debt level b. As illustrated in the first panel, as the firm increases its debt
issuance, it simultaneously reduces the equity issuance, since the investment is fixed at k∗ in this
experiment. The second panel illustrates a “Laffer curve”: as the face value of debt increases, the
4The technical condition (which we assume from now on) is that the function z → zh(z)
1−H(z) is increasing. Bernanke,
Gertler and Gilchrist (1999) make the same assumption in the context of a somewhat different model, and note that
most distributions satisfy this assumption, e.g. the log-normal distribution satisfies it. In our numerical example, we
will use the log-normal distribution.
5In practice the tax shield affects future profits and thus equity value, which is why we need to include it in the
firm value. Also, contrary to the empirical literature, we use the market value of debt rather than the book value. It
is the theoretically cleaner definition, and the quantitative difference turns out not to be very important.
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Figure 2.1: Optimal Choice of Debt. The figure shows the effects of debt b on the firm financing
options s and q ∗ b, the yield spread, the probability of default, the equity value V , and Tobin’s Q
in the baseline model. The vertical red line shows the optimal debt choice.
amount actually raised first increases nearly one-for-one, then less than one-for-one, and finally
falls as default becomes more likely. Default implies bankruptcy costs which will reduce the value
available to creditors, hence at some point a decrease in the total amount raised. Obviously the
firm never decides to increase debt beyond the maximum of this curve. Indeed, the third and fourth
panel document that the probability of default, and hence the credit spread, has a “hockey stick”
pattern as debt is increased, and the firm limits its debt issuance to remain safely left of the sharp
increase. The last panel shows that the firm actually picks the debt level to maximize Q: ex-ante,
the firm’s managers decide on financial policy to maximize the total firm value (i.e. we can think
of the manager as deciding on debt and equity issues so as to maximize the value he can raise by
selling the firm in both debt and equity markets).
We can now use this “toy model” to perform comparative statics. As is well known, an increase
in the recovery rate θ reduces the expected bankruptcy costs, and hence, according to equation
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(2.7), lead to higher leverage z∗, and, according to equation (2.6), to a higher capital stock. The
probability of default H(z∗) also rises, leading to a rise in the spread. The equity value falls as firms
substitute debt for equity. Similarly, an increase in the tax shield parameter χ reduces the user
cost of capital and hence leads, according to equation (2.6), to a higher capital stock, higher debt,
as well, a higher leverage z∗, and hence a higher probability of default, higher spreads and higher
equity value. Last, an increase in the mean of z leads to a higher capital, equity value, and debt, but
does not affect z∗ or the probability of default. Table 2.1 summarize the result of the comparative
statics.
k b z∗ Pr(default) Spread V
θ + + + + + −
χ + + + + + +
Mean of H + + 0 0 0 +
Risk of H − − + + + +
Table 2.1: Summary of the Comparative Statics. Effect of an increase of each parameter on
the endogenous variables.
We now turn to the main experiment of this section, the effect of a mean-preserving spread of
the distribution H. Because the analysis depends on the exact shape of the distribution function,
no analytical result is available, but we consider some numerical examples. Specifically, we assume
that z is log-normally distributed, with mean − 12σ2 and variance σ2. As a result, an increase in σ is
a mean-preserving spread of H.6
Figure 2.2 shows the responses of the endogenous variables as we increase σ. The specific pa-
6For any σ, we have E(z) = 1 and we can obtain simple formula for the integrals appearing in these formulas.
In particular, we use the result that if log z is N(µ, σ), then the cumulative distribution function of z is H(z) =
Φ
(
log z−µ
σ
)
, where Φ is the standard normal CDF. Moreover the probability distribution function is,
h(z) =
1
σz
φ
(
log z − µ
σ
)
=
1
σz
1√
2pi
exp
(
−
(
log z − µ
σ
)2)
,
where φ is the standard normal PDF. Last, we have for all x,∫ x
0
zh(z)dz = Φ (γ − σ)E(z)
with γ = log x−µ
σ
.
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rameter values used for this example are: β = .95, α = .9, θ = .5, χ = 1.03, but the results appear
extremely robust to changes in these parameter values. Intuitively, the increase in volatility increases
the probability of default, and hence the expected bankruptcy costs, making debt less attractive.
This leads the firm to reduce its leverage, which lowers the probability of default, but does not com-
pletely offset the effect of a higher σ. The higher probability of default naturally pushes up the yield
on the debt. Last, the higher bankruptcy costs increase the user cost, which generates a reduction
in the capital stock. This numerical example suggests that shocks to volatility can generate the
pattern of correlations needed to match the empirical evidence outlined in the introduction.
Figure 2.2: Comparative Statics. The figure shows the effects of volatility σ on the optimal firm
policies k and b, the yield spread, the probability of default, the equity value V , and Tobin’s Q in
the baseline model.
There is however one dimension in which the model is failing: as shown in the bottom-right panel
of Figure 2.2, Tobin’s Q is unaffected by the volatility σ. Indeed, it is easy to show that Q = 1α .
Intuitively, as σ rises, the firm value falls, and k falls, but these two quantities fall proportionately,
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and hence their ratio Q is unchanged. Formally, the user cost equation (2.6) can be written as,
1 = βαkα−1N,
where N = E(z)+ expected tax shield − expected bankruptcy costs. Tobin’s Q is actually,
Q =
βkαN
k
,
and hence Q = 1α , the expected average profit rate. This feature of the model, however, is highly
specific to this example: the marginal value of capital is proportional to the average value, which is
why Q is invariant to all parameters except α. We now consider a simple extension of the example
with a growth option, which breaks the proportionality of the average and marginal value of capital.
Extension with Growth Option
We extend the model in a minimal way, by assuming that the value of operations at time 2 is
not zkα but zkα + G(z), where G is a growth option, i.e. G(z) is the expected present discounted
value of future profits if z is realized.7 We assume that G′(z) > 0. In our quantitative model (see
Section 2.3), the growth option will be endogenously determined by the future profits of the firm.
With this modification, the firm will now default if z < z∗ where
z∗kα +G(z∗) = b,
and the bond price is,
q(k, b) = β
(∫ ∞
z∗
dH(z) +
∫ z∗
0
θ
zkα +G(z)
b
dH(z)
)
,
where we assume that the growth option can also be recovered at rate θ.8 The firm equity value is,
V = β
∫ ∞
z∗
(zkα − b+G(z)) dH(z).
7To make G endogenous, we may write a three-period model, e.g. at time 2 the firm can buy capital to take
advantage of the realized z.
8Alternative assumptions are possible and do not affect the main result significantly.
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The firm picks k, b, s, z∗ to maximize its present discounted value, V −s, which leads to two first-order
conditions. First,
1 = βαkα−1
{
E(z) + (χ− 1) z∗ (1−H(z∗)) + (θχ− 1)
∫ z∗
0
zdH(z)
}
,
which is the same as equation (2.6), since the marginal value of capital is unchanged – the only effect
of the growth option is to change the default region. Second, we have,
(χ− 1) (1−H(z∗)) k∗α = χ (1− θ) (z∗k∗α +G(z∗))h(z∗).
Note that this equation simplifies to the condition (2.7) if we assume G(z) = 0.
Figure 2.3: Comparative Statics. The figure shows the effects of volatility σ on the optimal firm
policies k and b, the yield spread, the probability of default, the equity value V , and Tobin’s Q in
the model extended with a growth option.
Figure 2.3 illustrates the effect of an increase in σ on the firm value in this extended model.9
As in the example above, k and b fall, as expected bankruptcy costs rise, and the probability of
9The parameters are as in the first example.
We set G(z) = γz with γ = .4
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default, the spread and the equity value all increase. The key difference is that this model now also
generates an increase in Tobin Q in response to the increase in σ.
To understand this, we can compute Q, which after some algebra is,
Q =
βkα
(∫∞
0
zdH(z) + (χ− 1) z∗ ∫∞
z∗ dH(z) + (θχ− 1)
∫ z∗
0
zdH(z)
)
+β
∫∞
0
G(z)dH(z) + (χ− 1)βG(z∗) ∫∞
z∗ dH(z) + β (θχ− 1)
∫ z∗
0
G(z)dH(z)
k
=
1
α
+
β
∫∞
0
G(z)dH(z) + (χ− 1)βG(z∗) ∫∞
z∗ dH(z) + β (θχ− 1)
∫ z∗
0
G(z)dH(z)
k
,
i.e. Q equals the expected profit rate 1α , plus the ratio of the expected value of the growth option and
its tax shield, net of bankruptcy costs, to the capital stock. An increase in σ, to a first order, does
not affect this expected value, but it does reduce the capital stock and hence increases Q. Because
the average and marginal value of capital are not proportional any more, the model can generate
the intuitive result for all four key variables (capital, yields, equity value and Tobin Q).
This example has highlighted the key mechanism of the model. We now turn to a fully dy-
namic model with more realistic features, to provide a quantitative evaluation of the strength of the
mechanism.
2.3 Quantitative Model
This section presents a partial equilibrium dynamic model of investment and financing decisions.
This model is an extension of the static model presented in Section 2.2. Firms are ex-ante identical
but become heterogeneous ex-post because of different idiosyncratic realizations of productivity and
volatility shocks. As in the static model, firms can borrow in the form of a one-period defaultable
debt. Bankruptcy costs are incurred upon default and the interest expense on debt can be deducted
from taxable income. The model builds on the recent corporate finance literature10, and more
specifically is an extension of the recent study of Gomes and Schmid (2009). The main difference is
that we explicitly introduce stochastic volatility shocks in order to quantify the effect of stochastic
10See Cooley and Quadrini (2001), Gomes (2001), Hennessy and Whited (2005).
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volatility on investment, credit spreads, and Tobin’s Q.
2.3.1 Firm Problem
The dynamic programming problem for a firm is to choose capital k′, debt bˆ′, and a default policy
to maximize the present value of dividends. The idiosyncratic productivity shock z and volatility
shock σ are exogenous shocks. Firms use physical capital as input to their production function.
Operating profits are denoted by pi(k, z) and are strictly increasing and strictly concave in capital,
that is pik > 0 and pikk < 0. Capital depreciates at rate δ, thus investment in capital follows the
equation,
i = k′ − (1− δ)k.
Firms have access to lenders and can borrow in the form of one-period debt contracts. The coupon
rate for a newly issued bond is denoted c′. Bonds are priced competitively. Profits are taxed at a
rate τ ∈ [0, 1] and interest expense can be deducted from taxable income. The dividend for the firm
is defined as the sum of after-tax profits and new debt issues, net of debt repayment, investment
and investment cost,
d˜ = (1− τ)pi(k, z) + bˆ′ − bˆ(1 + (1− τ)c)− i− φ(i, k).
where φ(i, k) is the cost of investing i from a capital level k. Financing frictions are present in the
form of costly equity issuances. Following Gomes (2001), equity can be issued at a proportional cost
λ, that is dividend net of equity issuance is given by,
d = (1 + λ1{d˜<0})d˜,
where 1{d˜<0} is the indicator function of strictly negative dividends, i.e. 1{d˜<0} = 1 if d˜ < 0 (and 0
otherwise). The value of the firm continuing operations is given by,
V (k, bˆ, s) = max
k′,bˆ′
d+ βE
[
max
(
0, V (k′, bˆ′, s′)
)]
,
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where β ∈ [0, 1] is the discount factor that firms take as given. The vector s contains all the
exogenous state variables in the economy. Specifically, the idiosyncratic productivity shock z and
volatility shock σ are included in the exogenous state vector.
2.3.2 Lenders
There is a continuum of competitive risk-neutral lenders. Any debt contract has to satisfy the
lenders’ Euler equation. Risky debt bˆ′ is supplied to firms at a coupon rate c′ such that,
bˆ′ = E
[
β
{
(1 + c′)bˆ′ 1{V ′≥0} + ξ (pi(k′, z′) + (1− δ)k′)(1− 1{V ′≥0})
}]
.
In this equation, c′ is the coupon rate, and ξ is the recovery rate upon default. We assume that
only current profits and the capital stock can be recovered.
For computational reasons, it is convenient to rewrite debt to be inclusive of interest payment and
net of tax shield subsidy,
b ≡ (1 + (1− τ)c)bˆ.
Following Gomes and Schmid (2009), the pricing equations can be rewritten as follows,
bˆ′ =
β E
[
1
1−τ b
′ 1{V ′≥0} + ξ (pi(k′, z′) + (1− δ)k′)(1− 1{V ′≥0})
]
1 + τ1−τ β E
[
1{V ′≥0}
] .
and the coupon rates can be written,
c′(k′, b′, s) =
1
1− τ
 1 + τ1−τ β E [1{V ′≥0}]
β E
[
1
1−τ 1{V ′≥0} + ξ
pi(k′,z′)+(1−δ)k′
b′ (1− 1{V ′≥0})
] − 1
 . (2.8)
2.3.3 Recursive Formulation of the Firm Problem
The firm problem is stated formally in the following.
Problem 2.3.1 (Recursive Formulation of the Firm Problem). Given the coupon schedule c′(k′, b′, s),
firms solve the following program,
V (k, b, s) = max
k′,b′
d+ β E [max (0, V (k′, b′, s′))] ,
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subject to,
d =
(
1 + λ1{d˜<0}
)(
(1− τ)pi(k, z) + 1
1 + (1− τ)c′(k′, b′, s)b
′ − b− i− φ(i, k)), (2.9)
i = k′ − (1− δ)k. (2.10)
2.4 Numerical Results
This section describes our approach to solve the model in Section 2.3. There are no closed-form
expressions for this equilibrium, therefore numerical techniques are employed to solve it. We explain
the choice of the key parameters of the model and describe the numerical approach.
2.4.1 Parameter Choice
The model is calibrated at the quarterly frequency. Table 2.2 reports the parameters we use for the
numerical exercise. The preference parameter β (i.e. the subjective discount rate) is set to generate
a 2% yearly risk free rate.
The productivity process z is parameterized along the lines of Gomes (2001) and Hennessy and
Whited (2005). The productivity process z is restricted to follow a first order autoregressive process
with normal innovations. Specifically,
z′ = ρzz + σ, (2.11)
where t+1 are independently and identically distributed shocks drawn from a standard normal
distribution. In order to match the persistence of firms’ output, the productivity process has to be
persistent, that is we set ρz = 0.97. These numbers are somewhat standard in the literature for this
type of exercise. The productivity process is represented by a discrete Markov chain using 50 points.
The stochastic volatility process is assumed to be a Markov chain with 3 states σ ∈ {σL, σM , σH}
and transition matrix Γσσ′ .
Firm profits exhibit decreasing returns in physical capital and the firm must pay a fixed cost of
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operation f each period. Profits are assumed to take the following functional form,
pi(k, z) = ezkα − f, (2.12)
where α ∈ (0, 1).
Following the Q theory literature,11 the capital adjustment cost function φ(i, k) is assumed to
be quadratic in investment rates, given by,
φ(i, k) =
1
2
θ1
(
i
k
− δ
)2
k 1{i/k<δ} +
1
2
θ2
(
i
k
− δ
)2
k 1{i/k>δ}, (2.13)
where θ1 and θ2 are parameters which capture the asymmetry between the cost of investing and
disinvesting. This formulation has been previously considered by Zhang (2005).
Cost of equity issuances are chosen to be 25%. This figure is reasonable as Hennessy and Whited
(2008) estimated these issuance costs to be about 6% using the simulated method of moments. The
average tax rate is chosen to be 20%. Bankruptcy costs are assumed to correspond to a dead-weight
cost of 40% of current capital stock, thus the recovery rate is set to ξ = 0.6. The set of parameters
used to solve the model is summarized in Table 2.2.
Preference β = 0.995 Risk free rate
α = 0.4 Production parameter
θ1 = 1 Adjustment cost parameter
Technology θ2 = 0.1 Adjustment cost parameter
f = 5 Fixed cost of operation
δ = 0.03 Capital depreciation rate
λ = 0.25 Linear cost of issuing equity
Institution ξ = 0.6 Recovery rate in event of bankruptcy
τ = 0.2 Average corporate tax rate
ρz = 0.97 Autocorrelation of z
σL = 0.1 Low Volatility of z
Uncertainty σM = 0.25 Medium Volatility of z
σH = 0.4 High Volatility of z
Table 2.2: Parameter Values. The model is calibrated at the quarterly frequency.
In order to understand the effect of the stochastic volatility in this environment, we will contrast
11For example, see Eberly, Rebelo and Vincent (2009).
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the results between a model with deterministic volatility and a model with stochastic volatility. The
level of volatility used in the deterministic is equal to the long-run average volatility of the stochastic
volatility Markov chain. Given the parameters of our computations, the model with deterministic
volatility has σ = 0.25.
2.4.2 Basic Properties
The model parameters have been selected so as to match moments of the data. The moments of
the data are taken from Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2009). Their sample of firms are taken from
Compustat in the period 1981-2003, and they focus on the top quartile of firms sorted by size of
the capital stock in 1981. The book leverage statistics are taken from Chen, Collin-Dufresne, and
Goldstein (2008).
Variable Data Model Model
Deterministic σ Stochastic σ
Real Side: Mean
Tobin′s Q Time-series Average 1.298 1.452 1.485
Time-series Volatility 0.625 0.606 0.626
Serial Correlation 0.838 0.514 0.471
i/k Time-series Average 0.150 0.079 0.084
Time-series Volatility 0.055 0.363 0.348
Serial Correlation 0.600 0.048 0.027
Financing Side: Mean
b/k Time-series Average 0.450 0.518 0.525
Time-series Volatility 0.090 0.155 0.152
Serial Correlation N.A. 0.935 0.931
c− rf Time-series Average (bps) 109 31 57
Time-series Volatility (bps) 41 46 80
Serial Correlation N.A. 0.008 0.017
Table 2.3: Summary Statistics. The summary statistics in the data are taken from Chen, Collin-
Dufresne, and Goldstein (2008) and Eberly, Rebelo, and Vincent (2009). The model economy is
simulated for a panel of 100 firms over 200 periods. Averages and volatilities for bond yields are
quoted in basis points.
Our model economy is solved and simulated for a panel of 100 firms over 200 periods. Summary
statistics of the firms’ optimal policies along with the data counterpart are given in Table 2.3.
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Although the model is solved at the quarterly frequency, all moments are reported at the annual
frequency. Most of the moments in the model economy are reasonably close the data moments. This
quantitative exercise shows that the model can in fact rationalize the aggregate quantities for firms,
both on the real side and the financing side. However it is important to note that the credit spreads
produced in the model are not as high as in the data. The model falls short for the deterministic
volatility model (31 basis points) and even for the stochastic volatility model (57 basis points),
compared to 109 basis points found in the data.
2.4.3 Predictability Properties
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of the model to replicate some standard corporate
finance regressions. We are interested in understanding how stochastic volatility impacts the co-
movements between investment rate and corporate bond yields.
The results for the regressions of investment on Q and spreads were provided to us by Gilchrist
and Zakrajsek. These authors assembled firm-level data on investment, Tobin Q and credit spreads
by merging the standard Compustat database with data on individual bond issues. The credit
spread of a firm is defined as the weighted average of the spread on each of its bond issues, where
the weights are the market value of each issue. Spreads are observed at the monthly frequency, and
the annual spread is the time-series average of the monthly spreads. The data covers the period
1983-2006 and is an unbalanced panel with 799 firms. Their results are summarized in Table 2.4.
Variable i/k log(i/k)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
log(c)
log(Q)
-0.035 -0.034
(0.005) (0.005)
0.051 0.0015
(0.016) (0.0018)
-0.297 -0.277
(0.024) (0.025)
0.241 0.156
(0.049) (0.046)
R2 (within) 0.054 0.064 0.062 0.208 0.146 0.203
Table 2.4: Data. Regressions results from Gilchrist and Zakrajsek (2009).
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Regression results for the model economy along with the data counterpart are given in Table 2.5.
The first result is that credit spreads explain about 5% of the variation in investment rates in the
simulated data for both models, as in the data. However the magnitude of the regression coefficients
is much higher than in the data. This result is mitigated in the model with stochastic volatility.
The second result is that the addition of Q in the regressions improves the fit dramatically, from an
R-squared of about 5% to 70% for the deterministic volatility model, and to 60% for the stochastic
volatility model. In contrast, Q does not improve the explanatory power much beyond credit spreads
in the data, from an R-squared of 5.4% to 6.2%. Again this problem is mitigated in the model with
stochastic volatility. Overall the model with stochastic volatility performs better than the model
with deterministic volatility.
Variable Data Model Model
Deterministic σ Stochastic σ
log(c)
log(Q)
-0.035 -0.034
(0.005) (0.005)
0.002
(0.002)
-0.166 -0.045
(0.026) (0.015)
0.357
(0.008)
-0.115 -0.047
(0.017) (0.011)
0.322
(0.009)
R2 0.054 0.062 0.046 0.704 0.047 0.601
Table 2.5: Regression Results. The regressions results in the data are taken from Gilchrist and
Zakrajsek (2009). Regressions in the model are run on data simulated for a panel of 100 firms over
200 periods.
2.5 Conclusion
We introduced stochastic volatility in a standard model of corporate finance and investment. We
showed that, consistent with intuition, this additional shock can generate higher correlations between
credit spreads and investment, and weaker correlations between Q and investment, as in the data.
However, the correlation between spreads and investment is still too small, and the correlation
between Q and investment is still too high, compared to the data.
In future work, we plan to introduce some extensions which might magnify the effect of stochastic
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volatility. First, we may introduce risk-aversion through an exogenous stochastic discount factor.
Second, we may introduce long-term debt. Third, we may consider different specifications for ad-
justment costs. We also plan to study empirically the correlation of firm-level stock returns and
bond returns, to measure directly the amount of stochastic volatility in the data.
A possible extension of the project is to consider the macroeconomic implications of the model,
when the shock to volatility is correlated across firms. A lower volatility, such as the “Great Moder-
ation”, would lead firms to take on more debt, and increase leverage and investment. In the process,
they might become more sensitive to productivity (or other) shocks.
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